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 Abstract 
Legal research and legal writing are often informed by preconceptions closely tied to mainstream legal 
assumptions. Asking the right questions is a much needed exercise to expose ideological and 
methodological preconceptions in legal research. This compilation of texts draws upon some 
provocative questions such as: Why legal methodology? Why human rights? Why anti-discrimination? 
Why social justice? Why efficiency? Why democracy? Why the public / private law divide? Why 
should international law be law? Why socialise risks? These questions were asked during two popular 
editions of a seminar called the ‘Why-Seminar’ at the European University Institute. They ended up 
creating an ‘experimental setting’ where researchers discussed their methodological choices and were 
challenged to disclose their methodological preconceptions. Interdisciplinarity became an essential, 
and in many ways, surprising tool to deeply understanding legal phenomena or phenomena with legal 
reverberance. Interdisciplinary research revealed that serendipity can also be a good ally of the legal 
researcher.  
Keywords 
Interdisciplinary research, legal methodology, legal research, research question, legal problem
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INTRODUCTION 
The Why Seminar – Questioning Mainstream Legal Assumptions was first created in 2011 as part of 
the curriculum of the doctoral and master’s program of the Law Department of the European 
University Institute, organised an run by Miguel Poiares Maduro and Hans-W. Micklitz. A second 
edition of this seminar took place in 2012. As the title suggests, this seminar was created to encourage  
researchers to question mainstream legal assumptions that inform legal research and legal writing. It 
was created to challenge legal researchers to question their ideological or methodological 
preconceptions regarding their understanding of law and their approach to it. This idea of 
preconceptions and the need for disclosure was heavily promoted by Josef Esser in his ground 
breaking book on ‘Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl’, published in 1972 and unfortunately never 
translated into English.
1
 The strong focus on policy driven research questions for PhD projects served 
as a trigger for the organisation of the seminars. The seminar was built around key questions taken 
from the political discourse underpinning legal research: Why legal methodology? Why human rights? 
Why anti-discrimination? Why social justice? Why efficiency? Why democracy? Why the public / 
private law divide? Why should international law be law? Why socialise risks? These were some of 
the ‘provocative’ questions researchers were asked and for which they were invited to provide answers 
that would go beyond what they assumed to be ‘good or ‘bad’, ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. A selection of texts 
providing arguments for and against human rights, democracy, the public private divide, international 
law, socialisation of risks served as a basis for discussion. 
A legal researcher focusing on sensitive political questions is faced with an array of stimuli stemming 
from the contact with jurisdictions other than their own, and from the blurring of lines dividing 
disciplines in their own field. In the 21st century legal research is becoming increasingly 
interdisciplinary: First social legal research dominated the debate, now it is law and economics as well 
as law and behavioural economics. Lawyers have to be and have had to become aware of the need to 
find an adequate method for interdisciplinary research. They are looking at law and questioning why 
the legal method is so different, or whether there is a method at all. Moreover, globalisation has 
changed the world. It has changed the mindset of market participants, the needs of the consumer and 
the reach of laws. A social sciences approach to law and the phenomenon of globalisation with an 
emerging field of global law or global legal studies compels legal researchers to disclose their 
preconceptions and the values by which they are guided. The ‘Why Seminar’ inspired participants to 
do just that. It made researchers to articulate the deeper reasons for their underlying assumptions and 
to realise that each and every work of research is based on preconceptions; the only way out of the 
methodological trap is to disclose one’s preconceptions and to discuss them properly in the context of 
the relevant theoretical frameworks. There is no good or bad preconception in particular, the point to 
be made is much more about the awareness of the existence of a particular preconception and the 
consequences this brings for the project being undertaken. This allows for emergence of a different 
path of questioning and reasoning, and for new avenues of research. 
This document is a selection of four papers that came out of lively debates held in the seminar 
sessions. They take an interdisciplinary approach and all aim at disclosing and discussing the 
particular method chosen. They do not seek to present final results, but rather - in line of the purpose 
of the seminar – to explore the consequences of the why-question. Alexandre Skander Galand writes 
on ‘Judicial Pronouncements in International Law: The Arrest Warrant Case Obiter Dicta’. He 
questions the manifestations of judicial maximalism in international law. By using the obiter dicta of 
the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case as a case study, he dwells upon the idea 
of misuse of judicial pronouncements at the international level, which are ultimately to the detriment 
of the fundamental principles of international law. In ‘Of Democracy and Other Fables: The 2012 
                                                     
1
 Josef Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung, Frankfurt am Main, 1970. 
 2 
Greek Parliamentary Elections’, Anna Tsiftsoglou looks to the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Greece 
for to deal with questions of democracy, legitimacy and accountability at the national and EU levels at 
a time of crisis. Jan Zglinski asks ‘What Courts Do When They Do What They Do’, and discusses the 
ambiguity of legal reasoning undertaken by courts, including the Court of Justice of the EU. Lécia 
Vicente then inquires ‘Why Efficiency’. She uses game theory to set up a model that illustrates just 
how complex relationships between the members of a private limited liability company can be. 
Ultimately, she intends to provoke a discussion on the terms upon which corporate default rules can be 
designed according to a principle of Pareto optimality.  
‘Why?’ is the common question in each of these papers, however perhaps what is most interesting is 
that by trying to strip their arguments of preconceptions the authors easily came to another question: 
‘Why not?’. This musing too requires a disclosure of the arguments lurking behind it. 
 
Florence, January 2015   Hans -W. Micklitz  
Lécia Vicente 
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JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ARREST WARRANT CASE 
OBITER DICTA 
Alexandre Skander Galand* 
Abstract 
Courts often say more than required to reach their decisions. While these judicial pronouncements 
have been criticised at the national level, it has been argued by international judges and commentators 
that they are necessary in international law. International law is vague and undeveloped; judicial 
maximalism is in that sense to the benefit of international law. Nevertheless, the reason international 
judges write obiter dicta might be solely to mitigate the effect of the ratio decidendi of their decision. 
This paper argues that the obiter dicta of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case 
were given for just such a reason. Furthermore, while the International Court of Justice has done no 
more than mention in passing that immunities of Heads of State do not apply before certain 
international criminal courts, these obiter dicta became the ratio decidendi of many international 
criminal courts. This case study demonstrates that when the judicial pronouncements of one actor are 
used by other actors to fit their agenda, international law may develop to the benefit of certain 
institutions and possibly at the expense of the fundamentals of international law. 
Introduction 
Why should a court append its reasoning to a decision it takes? This is one of the first questions the 
‘Why Seminar’ asked us to consider. During the session where we discussed this issue my opinion 
was that “la bouche de la loi”, as Montesquieu portrayed the judge, must give his or her motif to reach 
the dispositif in order to entitle the parties to appeal the decision if erroneous. However, the 
coordinators of the ‘Why Seminar’ rapidly made me realise that it is not the motifs that form the base 
of the appeal, but the dispositif. Thus, a mainstream legal assumption was questioned: Why do courts 
give grounds to their judgments? Various answers were offered, but one in particular seemed to be 
more appropriate to adjudications in international law. The answer to my ‘Why question’ was that 
international courts develop rules by ‘grounding’ their judgments. In other words, what appeared to be 
a discursive judgment was actually a form of judicial law-making. This conclusion became even more 
evident when I started to turn over the justification of a case that was at the centre of my research: 
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(‘Arrest Warrant Case’). 
On the 4
th
 of February 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its judgment in the 
Arrest Warrant Case. Since then, the Arrest Warrant Case has been the most oft-quoted judgment for 
any court, practitioner or academic who addresses the subject of immunities of state officials from 
foreign criminal jurisdiction. In its application instituting proceedings, Congo asked the ICJ to declare 
that: (1) The Belgian law on universal jurisdiction over international crimes violated the principle of 
sovereign equality; and, (2) the arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity against the 
Congolese foreign affair minister, Yerodia, violated the immunity to which this high ranking official 
was entitled under international law. During the proceedings, Congo changed its strategy and amended 
its application to challenge the arrest warrant against its foreign affair minister only.  The ICJ decided 
that according to the rule non ultra petita, “it is the duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions 
as stated in the final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in 
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those submissions.”2  The ICJ added that “the non ultra petita rule nonetheless cannot preclude the 
Court from addressing certain legal points in its reasoning.”3 As I will explain in this paper, the ICJ 
did not, indeed, restrict itself to deciding whether the arrest warrant against Yerodia violated the 
international law on immunities. It went beyond what was necessary to resolve the issue before it by 
stating that immunities do not bar proceedings before “certain international criminal courts, where 
they have jurisdiction.”4 The reasons it provided for such an exception to immunity of State officials 
will be explored below.  Moreover, I will attempt to demonstrate briefly that judicial maximalism can 
lead to unintended consequences. The state of law is never set for all perpetuity; it evolves and 
sometimes for the best, especially when it falls into the hands of an interested player. 
Judicial Maximalism  
Cass R. Sunstein, writing about US Supreme Court judgments, argues in favour of judicial 
minimalism, i.e. expressing only what is necessary to justify a decision and leaving undecided as many 
legal issues as possible.
5
 According to Sunstein, “the constructive use of silence” by courts reduces the 
burden of judicial decisions, promotes democracy and makes judicial errors less frequent.
6
 On the 
other hand, the particularity of international law might require another approach. Judge Fitzmaurice in 
the Barcelona Traction Case wrote a separate opinion where he explains that the duty of international 
judges – in a system lacking an international lawmaker – is not only to clarify the law but also to 
contribute to the development of international law.
7
 In other words, international judges have the 
judicial burden to say more than what is required by in deciding the case at hand; this would result in 
judicial maximalism. International law, unlike municipal law, is not a democratic system whereby a 
government can enact specific legislative action with direct binding effect that reflects the choice of its 
electors. Nevertheless, it is true that international courts as much as national courts are at risk of 
making a judicial error when delivering a decision.  
The ICJ Statute does not require that judgments be adopted unanimously;
8
 judges are allowed to 
dissent from the majority judgment, in whole or in part. Moreover, any judge is entitled to deliver  
a separate or dissenting opinion, which is appended to the majority judgment. While separate opinions 
bear the value of obiter dicta, they can bring clarifications to the judgment which itself tends to be 
constrained by the need to express the consensus of the majority. Dissenting opinions, on the other 
hand, express judges’ reasons for not being part of the majority. These dissenting opinions can serve 
as a basis for changes in international practice, but can also help explain the critical issue that divided 
the bench. Altogether, these opinions contribute to elucidating and progressively developing 
                                                     
2 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), International Court of Justice, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3, par. 43 (Hereinafter the Arrest Warrant Case). Reference is made to Asylum, Judgment. 1. C.J. 
Reports 1950, p. 402. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., par. 61. 
5 Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at A Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 4-5. 
6 Ibid.. 
7 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, ICJ Report 1970, p. 64, par. 2, Judge Fitzmaurice. “In addition, 
there are a number of particular matters, not dealt with or only touched upon in the Judgment of the Court, which 1 
should like to comment on. Although these comments can only be in the nature of obiter dicta, and cannot have the 
authority of a judgment, yet since specific legislative action with direct binding effect is not at present possible in the 
international legal field, judicial pronouncements of one kind or another constitute the principal method by which the law 
can find some concrete measure of clarification and development. I agree with the late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht that 
it is incumbent on international tribunals to bear in mind this consideration, which places them in a different position 
from domestic tribunals as regards dealing with-or at least commenting on points that lie outside the strict ratio decidendi 
of the case.” 
8 International Court of Justice Statute, Article 55. 
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international law. Even though this plenitude of opinions might significantly diverge on a specific 
question and cast a certain uncertainty on the words of the majority judgment, the relativity it brings 
confirms that the state of international law on a certain issue is never carved in stone.  
The influence of the ICJ case law 
There is no rule of stare decisis at the ICJ. Moreover, other courts are not obliged to follow the 
precedents of the ICJ. Nevertheless, the ICJ case law bears significant importance in international law. 
It is accepted that the sources of international law are: (a) International conventions; (b) customary 
international law; (c) general principles of law; and (d) judicial decisions and teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law.  The decisions of the ICJ are legally only binding on the States party to the case and in respect 
of the particular dispute.
9
 Case law of the ICJ is not a legally binding source of law, but as the most 
specialised court for general international law matters, they serve as a good indicator of the state of 
international law.
10
 Furthermore, for the sake of consistency, national and international courts are 
reluctant to go against a finding of the ICJ, especially when it appears to spell out customary 
international law.
11
 This said, a court may feel more at ease disregarding an obiter dictum than a ratio 
decidendi.  While a ratio decidendi is the point in a decision which determines the judgment, an obiter 
dictum is an opinion expressed by the Court unnecessary for the final decision.
12
 The deconstruction of 
a judgment distinguishes the obiter dicta from the ratio decidendi.    
The Arrest Warrant Case - Ratio Decidendi 
The ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case was asked to state whether the arrest warrant issued by Belgium 
against Yerodia for war crimes and crimes against immunity violated the immunity to which foreign 
affair ministers are entitled under international law. According to the ICJ, the functions of the Foreign 
Affairs Minister Yerodia qualified him as a high ranking State official entitled to immunity equivalent 
to that enjoyed by Heads of State and Heads of Government.  For this reason, the ICJ found that 
Yerodia was entitled to immunity from foreign jurisdiction for his official acts as well as for his 
private acts for the entire duration he held this office. According to the ICJ, this full immunity applies 
regardless of whether the high ranking State official is on foreign territory for an official or private 
visit, or whether the acts were performed in an official or private capacity. As the Belgian arrest 
warrant prevented Yerodia from exercising the functions of his office, his full immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction and inviolability were violated. The immunity to which he was entitled protected him 
against “any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his 
or her duties.”  Finally, after reviewing national and international case law and instruments, the ICJ 
declared that customary international law does not provide any exception to the immunity of a foreign 
affairs minister before foreign criminal jurisdiction, even where suspected of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. This is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. These were the Court’s grounds for 
deciding that the Belgian issuance of an international arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity against the Congolese foreign affairs minister “constituted a violation of an obligation of 
Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of that Minister and, more 
particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by 
him under international law.”13  
                                                     
9 International Court of Justice Statute, Article 59. 
10 Moreover, they may contribute to the development of international law, Hersh Lauterpacht, The Development of 
International Law by the International Court, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 21. 
11 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Report,  p. 237. 
12 Black’Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition, 1990). 
13Arrest Warrant Case, par. 70, 71. 
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The Arrest Warrant Case - Obiter dicta 
After stating its conclusion regarding the arrest warrant for Yerodia, the ICJ decided it needed to stress 
that “immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean 
that they enjoy impunity”.14 In order to exemplify its rhetorical statement, the ICJ then enumerated 
four circumstances where the immunity of a sitting high ranking official would not represent a bar to 
criminal prosecution: (1) When proceedings are instituted by the national authorities of the State he or 
she represents; (2) when the State he or she represents or has represented waives the immunity; (3) 
when the high State official no longer holds office, other States may try him for acts committed in a 
private capacity; and (4) when the high ranking official is subject to proceedings before “certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction.”15  These are obiter dicta as they are not 
grounds or justifications for the Court to reach its final decisions. Now the question is why did the ICJ 
decide to write this obiter dicta? As pointed out above, international law – because of its particularities 
– is in need of clarification. Judges that adopt a maximalist approach when writing judgments are said 
to have this purpose in mind when making obiter dicta. But could these extra judicial pronouncements 
have other aims?  
The Four Circumstances of the Arrest Warrant Case Obiter Dicta 
The ICJ obiter dicta has – it should be pointed out – been severely criticised in literature as being 
inconsistent with international law.  In the 1990s, the fight against the impunity of perpetrators of 
international crimes had increasingly become one of the most important values of the international 
community. In a lauded decision in March 1998, the United Kingdom House of Lords, upheld the 
finding that the former Head of State of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, was not immune from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction for the international crime of torture.
16
 In 1993 and 1994, the Security Council 
(SC) of the United Nations (UN) established two ad hoc tribunals for the prosecution of the persons 
most responsible for the commission of international crimes in former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTY dismissed the relevance of the former Head of State position of Slobodan 
Milosevic four months before the Arrest Warrant Case,
17
 and in 1998 the ICTR sentenced Jean 
Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity 
and genocide.
18
 In the same year, the Rome Statute was adopted and Sierra Leone was negotiating 
with the Secretary General of the UN for the establishment of a hybrid court. Indeed, international law 
was reaching its peak in the fight against impunity. Nevertheless, the Arrest Warrant Case fails to 
concretely acknowledge this advancement, at least in respect of immunities from the criminal 
jurisdiction of foreign national courts. Let us briefly re-examine the four circumstances where 
immunity does not represent a bar to criminal prosecution.  
The first and second circumstances, i.e. national proceedings and waiver of immunity, have not caused 
many disagreements.  They rest upon two fundamental principles of international law: Sovereignty 
and consent. In this sense, they confirm principles that were well established in international law and 
that arguably did not need any clarification. However, the third and the fourth circumstances, namely 
prosecution of former officials for acts committed in a private capacity, and the prosecution before 
“certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction” have been the subject of a hot 
debate between scholars and have given rise to varying interpretations by international courts.   
                                                     
14 Ibid., par. 60. 
15 Ibid., par. 61 
16 Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte, United 
Kingdom, House of Lords, 24 March 1999, reproduced in International Legal Materials, vol. 38 (1999), p. 581-663. 
17 Prosecutor v Milosevic, ICTY, Case No. IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary Motion, 8 November 2001. 
18 Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, ICTR, Case No. IT-97-23-S, Judgment, 4 September 1998. 
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The third circumstance exists where the high State official no longer holds office; other States “may 
try the former high ranking officials in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her 
period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private 
capacity”.19 In other words, the high ranking official is only immune from foreign criminal jurisdiction 
for the acts committed in an official capacity. Obviously, this is difficult to reconcile with the principle 
of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes committed in the name of the State. As 
Judge Van den Wyngaert
20
 and many commentators argued,
21
 most international crimes are committed 
on behalf of the State, and to negate the official character of such crimes would be “to fly in the face 
of reality.”22  Furthermore, if the authorities of the home state remain in connivance with the former 
State official, it is highly unlikely that national proceeding will be instituted against the former official 
(first circumstance) or that a waiver of immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction will be issued 
(second circumstance). Consequently, impunity is almost guaranteed. While Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their separate opinion underlined that international crimes cannot be 
regarded as official acts, the silence of the majority judgment on this point leaves the issue unsettled 
and at risk of being interpreted to the contrary.
23
 To sum up, the third circumstance brings more 
confusion than clarification, and arguably is a judicial error or a regression of international law.  
The obiter dicta’s fourth circumstance – “certain international criminal courts” – to some extent 
compensates for the ICJ’s failure to spell out clearly whether international crimes committed in an 
official capacity can be prosecuted before foreign criminal jurisdiction. The Court enounces this fourth 
situation as the perfect solution against the impunity of perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Indeed, the ICJ declares that the immunity of incumbent as well as former 
State officials is irrelevant when prosecuted by “certain international criminal courts”. In this situation, 
the distinction between acts committed in a private or official capacity is irrelevant. However, the 
formulation adopted brought with it a fair number of controversies as well.
24
 Instead of leaving 
undecided what constitutes an international criminal court, and, consequently leaving places for new 
courts to be established, the obiter dicta lists three courts that it considers as being of an international 
character. The ICTY and ICTR figure as courts established by the SC as measures under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is a treaty-based court containing 
in its statute an article asserting its jurisdiction over any official.
25
 These courts are listed in the obiter 
                                                     
19 Arrest Warrant Case, par. 61 (emphasis added). 
20 Ibid., Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, par. 34-36. 
21  See e.g. Antonio Cassese in When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the 
Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 European Journal of International Law 853-875 (2002); David S. Koller, Immunities of 
Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of the Yerodia Judgment As It Pertains to the Security Council and the International 
Criminal Court, 20 American University International Law Review 7-42 (2004); Marco Sassòli, L’arrêt Yerodia: 
quelques remarques sur une affaire au point de collision entre les deux couches du droit international, 106 Revue belge 
de droit international 791-818 (2002); Jan Wouters, The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest 
Warrant Case: Some Critical Remarks, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 253-267 (2003). 
22 Craig Barker, International Law and International Relations: International Relations for the 21st Century (Continuum, 
2000), p. 153. 
23 Arrest Warrant Case, Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, par. 85. 
24 See e.g. Dapo Akande, The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis 
and Limits, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 634 (2003); Paola Gaeta, Does President Al-Bashir Enjoy 
Immunity from Arrest? 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 315-332 (2009) 
25 Rome Statute, Article 27 reads as follows:  “Irrelevance of official capacity 
 1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of 
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.   
 2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or 
international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 
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dicta as having jurisdiction over incumbent high ranking officials. While the list is not exhaustive the 
criteria required to join this exclusive group can appear to be. The ambiguity here is whether there is a 
difference between courts established by the Security Council – which binds all UN Member States – 
and courts created by treaties – which bind only the signatory Member States – as is, allegedly, the 
case with the ICC. In fact, although the fourth circumstance is not crystal clear, it has definitely 
instigated a progressive development of international law.  
The Use of the Arrest Warrant Case Obiter Dicta by Other Courts 
Before the Arrest Warrant Case, it was doubted whether a treaty establishing an international criminal 
court could overrule the right to immunity of States not party. This uncertainty was understandable; 
the very core of international law rests on sovereignty and consent. The ICC was not yet in existence 
when the Arrest Warrant Case judgment was issued and, by the date of the judgment, had only had 
about 50 ratifications.
26
 Moreover, other international or internationalised courts were about to be 
established and, much to their resentment, they were not named in the ICJ obiter dicta. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in its 2004 decision on the immunity of Charles Taylor – President of 
Liberia at the time of the indictment - is entirely focused on fitting within the parameters of the ICJ 
obiter dicta.
27
 To put it briefly, the SCSL struggled to prove itself as a court established by the SC as a 
measure to restore international peace and security, even though it was established by an agreement 
between the Secretary General of the UN and Sierra Leone. As a court predicated on an SC resolution, 
the SCSL considered that, like the ICTY and the ICTR, it represented the will of the international 
community and could, therefore, overrule the immunity of the Head of State of any member of the 
UN. The SCSL ratio decidendi is that its legal basis fits within the Arrest Warrant Case obiter dicta 
requirements. On the other hand, the ICC in 2011, in the case against Omar Al-Bashir, President of 
Sudan, decided that “former or sitting heads of states not parties to the statute whenever the court may 
exercise jurisdiction” cannot invoke immunity “to oppose a prosecution by an international court”28. 
The contrast with the SCSL decision on the immunity of Charles Taylor is clear: Immunity of any 
Head of State is irrelevant before any international court, regardless of whether it is premised on SC 
measures or not. The ICC, as a court listed in the Arrest Warrant Case obiter dicta, inherently derives 
its mandate from the international community. At the end of the journey, the Arrest Warrant Case 
fourth circumstance moved from being a mitigating judicial pronouncement, to being a requirement, 
ultimately ending up as a justification for the exercise of jurisdiction over the immunity of high-
ranking State officials. 
Conclusion 
The ‘Why Seminar’ was obviously aimed at developing our inquisitive reflex. By questioning the 
reason for judicial pronouncements, I learned not only to differentiate the necessary from the optional, 
but also to study why the optional was chosen. True, in an international legal system, where a proper 
lawmaker is absent, judgments play a crucial role in the clarification and development of international 
law. In order to avoid fragmentation of international law, tribunals try to adjust their reasoning to the 
judgments of other courts. However, these judgments can be divided into grounds to reach the 
decision and opinions on incidental points. Even though there are no rules of stare decisis amongst 
                                                     
26 Rome Statute, Article 126 (1) reads as follows:  “This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 
60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” 
27 The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, 
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 May 2004. 
28 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 ,Decision Pursuant To Article 87(7) 
Of The Rome Statute On The Failure By The Republic Of Malawi To Comply With The Cooperation Requests Issued By 
The Court With Respect To The Arrest And Surrender Of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,  13 December 2011 par 36. 
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international tribunals, both parts of the body of the decision play a persuasive role when it comes to 
making further decisions on the same issue. In order to find the answer to my Why question, I started 
to deconstruct judgments. This process led me to conclude that often the justification was not only 
unnecessary to reach the decision, but moreover that it was actually an excuse to mitigate the effect of 
the judgment. Nevertheless, statements to take the edge off the effect of this judgment may become 
fundamental for other courts that have to rule on the specific point addressed in passing. An analysis 
of the Arrest Warrant Case and the way it has been used by concerned actors brought me to this 
conclusion.  
Through a critical inquiry about the various parts of judgments and their raison d'être, I came to 
understand that a case has to be read in line with the reception it will get from the actors involved. 
Legal scholarship, legal counsel, other courts and the same courts will read the justification for the 
judicial decision and will decide whether or not they adopt that justification as a rule. This form of 
global governance did not occur to me before. International law is not only clarified by international 
judges, but it also develops according to the institutional choice of the forum having to decide the new 
hard case it is facing. In this sense, an obiter dicta is in constant evolution. 
  10  
OF DEMOCRACY AND OTHER FABLES: THE 2012 GREEK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
Anna Tsiftsoglou
*
 
The WHY Question: A Radical Approach to Law 
In an attempt to write a final pre-PhD publication of mine in a more radical manner, this is not 
intended as a typical ‘legal’ essay. Rather, my paper strives to study a public law topic through a non-
conventional lens. My research guide will be the ‘why’ question, a sort of behind-the-facts 
investigatory query,
29
 and one which is unusual for a lawyer educated and trained partly in a legal 
positivist environment. In fact, my ambition to write something original that challenges mainstream 
legal assumptions urges me to ask four different ‘why’ questions. My case-study will be the 2012 
Parliamentary elections in Greece, a crisis-hit country with a long history of bipartisanism, going to 
the polls for the first time after receiving massive bailouts. Triggered by the ‘WHY Democracy’ 
session of the 2012 WHY Seminar in Florence, my paper deals with the wider questions of 
democracy, legitimacy and accountability on the national and EU levels in times of crisis. 
Interestingly, I find that these elections were pure evidence of the political more than financial crisis 
currently being faced by both Greece and Europe as a whole.   
WHY Elections: Could Greek Politics Survive the Crisis? 
The Greek General Elections of June 2012 came as the result of political deadlocks. Following a first 
round in May 2012 and the failure of major parties to form a coalition government, the June elections 
were called to put an end to instability; the question was how. With Greeks viewing this General 
election as the ultimate opportunity to punish the ‘austerity parties’, voting would turn to polarisation 
and extremes.
30
 In such a political crisis, the outcome could hardly be predicted.  
It was also the first time the Greeks went back to the polls since the two bailouts of 2010 and 2011.
31
 
By this time, things had changed: Whereas for the past three decades or so Greek politics had been 
dominated by two parties alternating in power by promising various benefits to the electorate, in 2012 
Greece was (and still is) under international financial supervision and citizens can no longer expect 
                                                     
* PhD (Honours) (University of Athens, Greece), LLM (Berkeley), Attorney-at-Law, Courts of Appeals, 
tsiftsoglou@gmail.com;  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Center of 
Excellence in Foundations of European Law & Polity Research, University of Helsinki, Finland under the theme 
‘Democracy and Law in Europe’, September 27-28, 2012. My warmest and sincere thanks go to Giuliano Amato, Miguel 
Maduro, Bruno de Witte, Petros Mavroidis, Hans Micklitz, Kaarlo Tuori, Sakari Melander and Massimo Fichera as well 
as the participants of the ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the EU Polity’ Workshop, the ‘Constitutional Developments in 
the EU’ and the WHY Seminars at the European University Institute for our stimulating discussions. The usual 
disclaimer applies here. 
29 For the importance of the WHY Questions in legal scholarship see Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. Micklitz & Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, Methodology in the New Legal World, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/13.   
30 Nikos Alivizatos, How do we Vote in Times of Crisis?, Kathimerini, May 27, 2012 [in Greek]. See also Elias Dinas and 
Lamprini Rori, The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and Loathing in the Polls, West European Politics, 
Vol.36:1, April 2013, 270-282, Yannis Mavris, Greece’s Austerity Election, New Left Review, Vol.76, July-August 
2012, and Gerasimos Moschonas, The May 2012 Elections: The Breakthrough, the Trends and SYRIZA, Syghrona 
Themata, Vol.116, pp.6-7 [in Greek].  
31 Greece signed two bail-out loan agreements (in May 2010 and October 2011) with the ‘Troika’ (EU/ECB/IMF) for the 
loan of €110 billion and €130 billion respectively. Both bail-outs were conditional on the implementation of reforms and 
harsh austerity measures (the so-called ‘austerity packages’).  For a thorough account of the ‘Greek financial drama’ see 
the commentary of Yannis Drossos, Greece- The Sovereignty of the Debt, the Sovereigns over the Debts & Some 
Reflections on Law, IGLP WP 7/2011.   
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such treats. Instead, Greeks must learn to live with austerity. As such, it was anticipated that the two-
party system would not survive the crisis and that new political players would soon emerge.  
The 2012 elections turned out to be a breakthrough. Greece became the first crisis-hit country in which 
bipartisanism collapsed, leading to greater political fragmentation.
32
 The June Round finished with a 
seven-party parliament, a massive defeat of the formerly-governing PASOK and a disproportionate 
empowerment of opposition parties. Former opposition party New Democracy (conservatives) won 
almost 30%. Polarisation drew many voters to extremists on both sides of the political spectrum. The 
far-left SYRIZA gained 27% of the vote, while far-right Golden Dawn gained an unprecedented 7% 
share and made its first entry into the Greek Parliament.  
What do these figures tell us? They signal the de-stabilisation of the Greek political system following 
a serious blow to bipartisanism,
33
 the rise of political extremism
34
 and even signs of a 1930s ‘Weimar 
Republic-like’ revival.35 The new economic reality has definitely affected politics: As Greece sinks 
into recession, we are witnessing the erosion of the political establishment.
36
 And the transition is 
certainly not going to be smooth.   
WHY Reactions: Would Greek Elections Stir the World? 
So how did the markets and politicians react to the Greek General Elections results? When the polls 
projected victory for austerity parties, global markets rose again
37
. The German Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble, following the May Round results, stated that the June Elections in Greece should 
be “a referendum on whether the country stays in the Euro”38. This was apparently also the opinion of 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who purportedly suggested this to the Greek President of the 
Democracy, although she later refuted it.
39
  
In October 2011, former Prime Minister George Papandreou’s idea to call a referendum on the Euro 
was met with outrage within and outside of Greece; this led to his resignation. The interim government 
of Lucas Papademos, set up shortly afterwards, deferred elections until certain Memoranda-of-
Understanding (MoU) measures were agreed. The idea behind the referendum and the elections was 
the same: Give Greeks the power to decide on Greece’s fate, whatever that may entail.  
However, things were not that simple. If Greece was not a Eurozone country and had not already 
agreed the biggest bailout in western history, Greeks could indeed go carelessly ahead with 
                                                     
32 The June 17, 2012 General Election Results are declaratory. Former governing party PASOK (socialists) won roughly 12% 
of total vote (down 31%), while SYRIZA (leftists) won a massive 27%, up 22% since the former General Elections in 
October 2009. Source: Ministry of the Interior, http://ekloges.ypes.gr/index.html [in Greek] (last visited July 18, 2014). 
33 The decline of dominant party systems and the popularity of anti-establishment parties find provenance in international 
economic integration. Mark Andreas Kayser, How Domestic is Domestic Politics? Globalization and Elections, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2007, Vol.10, 341-362 (353-57). 
34 As shown in the recent 2014 European Parliament Elections in Greece, the far-right Golden Dawn party has become the 
third parliamentary power gaining more than 9% of the total share of votes. See 
http://ekloges.ypes.gr/may2014/e/public/index.html?lang=en (last visited July 18, 2014). 
35 Mark Mazower, For Greece and Germany a Democratic Trial Looms, The Guardian, June 11, 2012. As the prominent 
historian and experton Greece, Mark Mazower, remarks, “With Neo-Nazis in Greece’s parliament and its two-party 
system buckling under austerity, are the bad old days returning?”  
36 Takis S. Pappas, Why Greece Failed, Journal of Democracy, April 2013, Vol.24:2, 31-45, 43 (pointing out that ‘the current 
financial crisis led to the demolition of the two mechanisms that, for decades, had supported Greece’s populist 
democracy’, namely political patronage and triumphant polarisation). 
37 Stocks and Euro Gain on Optimism About Greek Elections, The New York Times, May 28, 2012; See also the post-
election endorsement, Markets in Asia Get Greek Spark, Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2012. 
38 Greek Vote Escalates Crisis as Schäuble Raises Euro-Exit, Bloomberg, May 15, 2012. 
39 Merkel ‘Suggests Greek Referendum on Euro Membership’, BBC News, May 18, 2012.  
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referendums and elections. As things turned out, and due to poor planning, Greeks went to the polls 
late and aggressively. The political destabilisation of a Eurozone country in such enormous debt was a 
real threat for markets and politicians alike. At any rate, Greece would pay the price for breaching the 
bailout agreements.
40
  
Thus we saw the transplantation of the Latin proverb Pacta Sunt Servanda
41
 into Greek politics. 
Whereas ‘Pacta’, according to civil law tradition, used to legally bind only contracting parties, the 
bailout agreements,
42
 if breached, would have radiating effects upon current and future Greek 
generations. Greek citizens may have voted for or against the bailouts, but their vote has sent signs 
internationally. The legitimisation or rejection of the bailouts, which came a posteriori, certainly 
looked bizarre, but it has been externally judged
43
 by our creditors with far reaching consequences. 
Greek voters may have had their say on a national scale, but their expulsion from the Eurozone and a 
possible default would be decided on the basis of an agreement. Greece has thus undertaken long-term 
obligations to resolve its sovereign debt crisis and it cannot easily breach them while still remaining in 
the Eurozone. Here is where moral considerations come into play: Could the Eurozone stability 
determine – de jure or de facto – the national elections? Can democracy be contingent on how markets 
will react? And why should Greece matter at all?   
Due to its historical fate, Greece, through its parliament, had to be once again ‘in the forefront of 
Europe’s evolution’.44 The Greek Elections stirred politicians and markets alike because a possible 
‘negative’ outcome would have created large waves of protest around the continent, sending signals of 
disobedience to foreign parliaments and creditors. But what were the signals that were eventually 
sent?  
WHY Democracy: Can Greeks – or others – Take on the New EU Order? 
Thus we get to the heart of the matter: What did these elections signify?  
Greece, like Europe, is ultimately facing an existential crisis. Its institutions, primarily its Parliament, 
seem incapable of providing any feasible exodus from the austerity measures decided externally. 
Ruling parties primarily sign and ratify foreign agreements, lacking the power or even the willingness 
to negotiate them. Such agreements may even encroach on a nation’s constitutional provisions or 
impose constitutional amendments in the course of their national implementation. Fiscal policy, for 
                                                     
40 In Schäuble’s words, “If Greece (…) wants to stay in the Euro, then they have to accept the conditions.. No responsible 
candidate can hide that from the electorate…”. See Greek Vote Escalates Crisis, as above.  
41 [Latin] Agreements are to be kept; treaties should be observed. A Dictionary of Law. By Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. 
Martin. Oxford University Press 2009 Oxford Reference Online.  
42 The nature of the agreements signed between Greece and the troika (EU/IMF/ECB) has been disputed. According to a 
recent ruling of the Hellenic Supreme Administrative Court, they do not constitute ‘international agreements’. As such, 
they did not require ratification by the Greek Parliament with qualified majorities of 3/5 (180 out 300 MPs) under article 
28.2 of the Greek Constitution. Rather, such agreements merely constitute “political” (soft law) agreements that are not 
legally binding per se. Nevertheless, it was on the basis of those agreements that Greece committed. See ΣτΕ 668/2012 
(plenary session).  
43 See the controversial interview of IMF Director Christine Lagarde: Can the Head of the IMF Save the Euro?, The 
Guardian, May 25, 2012. When asked if voters in Greece and France were wrong to elect anti-austerity politicians, 
Lagarde diplomatically responded “You are never wrong when you have voted because you’ve acted in accordance with 
your conscience and your beliefs, and you’ve exercised your democratic right, which is, you know, perfectly legitimate in 
our democracies”. Nevertheless, Lagarde admits that in countries like Greece and Italy, politicians who were ‘unwilling 
to play by the IMF’s rules’ were ultimately ‘replaced’ by technocrats like Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos. This was 
of course “gifting Euro-sceptics evidence for their charge that the EU is fundamentally anti-democratic”.   
44 Mark Mazower, Democracy’s Cradle, Rocking the World, New York Times, June 29, 2011 (‘[T]oday, after the euphoria of 
the ‘90s has faded and a new modesty sets in among the Europeans, it falls again to Greece to challenge the mandarins of 
the European Union and to ask what lies ahead for the continent..’). 
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instance – a core area of self-government and formerly a state prerogative45 – will be decided  
on the basis of an international agreement.
46
 Sadly then, national sovereignty is gradually becoming 
the exception to the power rule.
47
 
The basic notion of representation seems to have changed in the new EU order. The principal-agent 
theory,
48
 prominent in representative democracy, seems not to be properly applicable anymore. The 
Greek Parliament, in our case, cannot function as an agent of its voters since several powers originally 
conferred on it have been unremittingly transferred to the EU level. Thus to avoid collapse and 
international isolation, the Greek Parliament now serves more as a ratifier or executor of foreign 
decisions. This is the modern trend: We witness the decline in the role of national parliaments who are 
becoming less agile as decision makers.
49
 At the same time, we view a growing demand for the 
transfer of decision making powers from the national to the EU level, with a parallel diminution of the 
state. National democracy is being eroded.  
The paradox of the story is the issue of accountability. Greek politicians, especially members of the 
former government, have been held accountable by the Electorate for promoting harsh austerity 
policies. However, most – if not all – of the present reforms being pushed for are the products of 
external decisions.
50
 Nevertheless, the actual decision makers, be it the IMF, the ECB or the EU 
bureaucrats, have not – and cannot – be held accountable in national elections. Accountability 
mechanisms have and will be restricted within Greek borders.
51
 
                                                     
45 See especially Kaarlo Tuori, The European Financial Crisis: Constitutional Aspects and Implications, EUI Working Paper 
LAW 2012/28, 45 (arguing about the erosion of national fiscal sovereignty).  
46 Bypassing traditional communitarian methods and altering the so-called ‘Maastricht architecture’ of the European 
Economic Constitution. Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty, EUI WP LAW 2012/09 
(Anna Kocharov, ed.), with very interesting contributions- see, amongst others, Bruno de Witte (discussing the nature of 
this fiscal regulation), Hans Micklitz (raising the input / output legitimacy issue) and Miguel Maduro (discussing the 
existential/political crisis of Europe).  
47 See, however, the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court of September 7, 2011 on the constitutionality of the 
Greek bail-out and the euro rescue package and of September 12, 2012 on the constitutionality of the German acts 
ratifying the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact Treaty, 2 BvR 987/10 and 2 BvR 1390/12 
respectively, according to which there was no essential violation of national budget autonomy as safeguarded by the 
German Parliament. See the comments of Bruce Ackerman and Miguel Maduro, Broken Bond, Foreign Policy, 
September 17, 2012 (arguing that the Court’s preliminary findings on further economic-but not political-integration will 
jeopardise the Eurozone in the long run, if unchanged). Also, Kaarlo Tuori, The European Financial Crisis.., 41.    
48 For an introduction to this political science doctrine see Carina Sprung, Even More or Even Better Scrutiny? Analyzing the 
Conditions of Effective National Parliamentary Involvement in EU affairs, European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 
2010, 14:02, 5-10, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-002a.htm.  
49 This could be viewed as a ‘post-democratic’ symptom, in the sense that existing democratic institutions may not always 
correspond to the political reality. See Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy, Polity Press, 2004. Such symptoms raise moral 
questions, if e.g. the EU should be treated as ‘a higher good’ that could override the interests of national politics and their 
representatives in democratic parliaments. See the arguments of Patricia Springborg, Sovereignty, Organized Hypocrisy, 
the Paradox of Post-9/11 International Relations, Paper presented at the 4th Annual Conference, ‘Democracy and Law in 
Europe’, CoE in Foundations of European Law and Polity Research, Helsinki, Finland, September 27-28 2012.  
50 As Yannis Drossos puts it, ‘The decisions asked… must pass through our constitutional institutions, mainly the Parliament 
and the Government, so that Greece will bear the ultimate political and legal responsibility for them. Thus, we offer our 
creditors warranties of constitutional eminence; they don’t need to come and occupy the country’. Yannis Drossos, The 
Sovereignty of the Debt…, as above, 41-42.   
51 This paradox is prevalent in other crises-hit countries, where domestic politicians are held accountable for downturns in 
regional or international economies affecting their own – a domestic effect of globalisation on political process. Kayser, 
How Domestic is Domestic Politics?..., as above, 346-9.  
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Thus, we come to understand the popularity of the ‘anti-memorandum discourse’52 in our politics. 
Unsurprisingly, a great number of voters supported the anti-memorandum front propagating even the 
renouncement of the bailout agreements and a Euro exodus.  
In a sense, many Greek voters might have been willing to send signs externally.
53
 Ultimately, the 
elections could be seen, as suggested, as a de facto referendum on the Euro and its deficiencies. By 
voting massively against austerity, Greeks’ economic despair and euro-scepticism transformed into 
protest against the EU as a whole, signalling a detachment
54
 from its institutions, the rise of nationalist 
sentiments and a strong quest for legitimacy.
55
 In deep recession, Greeks, like other Europeans, are 
turning cynical about the value of a common currency and even their commitment to the European 
project. The question is whether the Eurozone crisis could take us backwards, towards the re-
engagement of the national polity as the ‘preferred sovereign’.56 The recurring dilemma “euro or 
drachma” widely spelled out before the Elections sadly symbolised the tragic dilemma “Greece or 
Europe”.57 This is hard to swallow three decades after the country’s accession to the Union!  
The 2013 general election in Italy is yet another example of this rising trend. With the evolving 
popularity of politicians like Beppe Grillo and Silvio Berlusconi,
58
 the Italian political arena resembled 
a true comedy or even a théâtre de l'absurde. Although situated on exact opposite sides of the political 
spectrum, Grillo and Berlusconi shared, besides populism, a common and dominant conviction: 
Rejection of foreign-driven austerity and the rebirth of national pride.
59
 Voters who had lost faith in 
Monti’s technocratic government or the ‘elite political castes’60 elevated former comedian Grillo’s 
                                                     
52 Elias Dinas and Lamprini Rori, The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections…., as above, 278.   
53 See, for instance, Supporters of Bailout Claim Victory in Greek Election, The New York Times, June 17, 2012, where a 
Greek voter declared that the election was “…a message to Europe that you are not the boss – Mrs. Merkel, or anybody 
(…) We want somebody from our country to oversee our economic system”. See also Alexis Tsipras, The Greek Message 
for Angela Merkel, The Guardian, October 8, 2012.   
54 See Peter Lindseth, “Of the People”: Democracy, the Eurozone and Lincoln’s Threshold Criterion, article based on 
author’s Daimler Lecture at the American Academy in Berlin, February 8, 2012 available online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2056760 (last visited May 31, 2013) (pointing out the “democratic 
disconnect” of Europeans from the EU institutions as the biggest issue in the EU).   
55 The same happening in other Eurozone-creditor and debtor-countries, like Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, France, 
Spain and most recently, Italy. See The Euro Crisis: An Ever-deeper Democratic Deficit, The Economist, May 26, 2012 
(‘With no other way to influence Brussels except through governments that seem not to be listening, the cynical politics of 
impotence easily takes hold’).  
56 See Miguel Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What if this is As Good as it gets? In European Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State (J.H.H Weiler/ M. Wind, eds.), 2003, CUP (navigating the possibilities for a new concept of 
constitutionalism that will allow transition from the ‘sovereignty of the state’ to the ‘sovereignty of the constitution’), and 
the counter-arguments of Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s ´Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards, European 
Law Journal, 4:1, 5-28 (questioning the standards applied to EU institutions to assess EU legitimacy) and Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Myth of Europe’s Democratic Deficit, InterEconomics, Nov/Dec. 2008, 331 (deconstructing the deficit 
myth). 
57 Other EU countries may be facing this dilemma soon as well! See Francis Fukuyama, The Two Europes, The American 
Interest, May 8, 2012. The author brings back the ‘popular’ division of Europe between the ‘hard-working, Protestant 
disciplined Northern Europe’ against ‘a lazy, profligate Catholic-Orthodox South’ by further adding that ‘the real 
division is not a cultural one; it is between a clientelistic and non-clientelistic Europe’. Nevertheless, even countries of 
the North like Ireland have suffered from the crisis. Clientelism may indeed be one factor of the debt crisis but cannot be 
the only or the deciding one.   
58 Send in the Clowns: How Beppe Grillo and Silvio Berlusconi Threaten the Future of Italy and the Euro, The Economist, 
May 2, 2013: ‘Italy’s political convulsions underline the need for Mrs Merkel to adapt her prescription- So far it has been 
a lot of austerity and some reform; it should be the other way around’. 
59 Nikos Xydakis, Italy Shakes Unstable Europe, Kathimerini, February 26, 2013 [in Greek]. 
60 Rocco Polin, Reform or Perish: Assessing the Results of Italy’s Latest General Elections, ELIAMEP Crisis Observatory 
Working Paper No4, April 2013 (also pointing out the institutional issues- like the inefficient bicameralism and the 
electoral system- that contributed to the political deadlock in Italy). 
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Five Star Movement to become the third political force in Italy. It took two months, President 
Napolitano’s reappointment and Enrico Letta’s formation of the first right-left coalition since World 
War II for Italy to finally have a government, however short-term it proved to be because of Matteo 
Renzi’s rise to power a year later. Much more so than the Greek ones, the 2013 Italian Elections 
signified a popular backlash against the way Europe now works: Absent legitimacy, it won’t make it 
on the long run.  
The way things finally turned out in Greece shows only the Greek idiosyncrasy. Greek voters, at the 
end of the day, elected the lesser evil, avoiding dangerous outcomes. Despite the fierce opposition to 
bailouts, a large share of the electorate went for the party supporting them.
61
 The fear of being 
expelled from the Eurozone drew all risk-averse voters to the conservatives at the very last minute. As 
such, they resembled their fellow Irish voters in their Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum.
62
 With the 
fear of being barred from emergency EU funding in the near future,
63
 the recent Irish ‘yes’ only 
signifies the fatality of direct democracy in Europe today.   
WHY a Tragedy: Greece as a Victim of whose Vices?  
The different narratives of the crisis are endless. Upon whom should we place blame? The 
irresponsible bankrupt states, the greedy markets or the unhealthy system as a whole?  
Paul Krugman, in a well-versed op-ed written on the day of the June Elections,
64
 talks about ‘Greece 
as a Victim’. His argument is clear: It is not Athens and Greeks to blame for this situation, but rather 
Brussels, Frankfurt and Berlin. The Eurozone crisis is primarily a systemic crisis caused by early 
foundational errors, mainly the absence of centralised structures to support the common currency. Due 
to such incomplete EU federalisation, the origin of this crisis cannot be national but rather European.
65
 
Political integration hasn’t been sufficient indeed to promote our common plans. 
The European Union is not, however, like the United States of America – yet.66 Without an American-
style federal government
67
 and still utilising hybrid models
68
 of decision-making, the Monetary, but 
                                                     
61 The conservative party New Democracy won roughly 30% on Second Round and formed a tripartite coalition government 
with PASOK (12%) and the Democratic Left (DIMAR) (6%). Only a year later, in June 2013, a dispute over the abrupt 
closure of the national state broadcaster ERT, led DIMAR to leave the ruling coalition. See Greek Party Quits Coalition 
Over State TV Debacle, Reuters, June 21, 2013.  
62 EU Leaders Welcome Poll Result, Irish Times, June 1, 2012 (quoting the President of the European Council Herman van 
Rompuy, “With this vote, the Irish people have given their endorsement and commitment to European integration. This 
result is an important step towards recovery and stability”). 
63 Compare President Rompuy’s pompous endorsement of the referendum results above with Bridget Connolly’s – an Irish 
who Voted ‘Yes’– astonishing declaration: "The treaty will solve nothing, but [...] we're going to need European money 
next year, plain and simple […] We can't afford to be thumbing our noses at Europe right now." See Ireland Votes in 
Favor of EU Fiscal Pact, BBC News, June 1, 2012.   
64 Paul Krugman, Greece as a Victim, The New York Times, June 17, 2012.  
65 Jacques Attali, The Crisis is in Brussels, Not Athens, The New York Times, June 19, 2011. 
66 Although, as well stated, it is an ‘international organisation with elements of an embryonic federation’. Bruno de Witte, 
The European Union as an International Legal Experiment in JHH Weiler/ G. de Búrca, The Worlds of European 
Constitutionalism, 2012, Cambridge University Press (exploring the legal nature of the European Union as reflected on 
numerous historical judicial and doctrinal interpretations).  
67 And it does make sense to look at the EU through the US federal example. See the persuasive arguments of Sergio 
Fabbrini, Revisiting Altiero Spinelli: Why to Look at the EU through the American Experience in: EU Federalism and 
Constitutionalism: The Legacy of Altiero Spinelli (A.Glencross/ A.Trechsel, eds.), 2010, Lexington Books (viewing both 
the US and the EU as ‘compound democracies’-as Unions of States).   
68 Guiliano Amato, A New Inter-institutional Interplay after the Treaty of Lisbon?, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 
Vol.17:2, Spring/Summer 2011 (discussing the possible de-‘hybridisation’ of the EU decision-making model- a mix of 
intergovernmental and supranational methods - after the Lisbon Treaty).  
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predominately the European Union seems doomed.
69
 Nevertheless, the rhetoric of “more Europe” 
misses a big point: popular support. The difficult conciliation between the economic and the political 
view of the EU is grounded on its peculiar constitutionalisation process, its primarily economic 
orientation and thus, its unique nature.
70
 The EU remains a union of asymmetrical – be it culturally or 
materially – independent states. In post-national Europe, federalism could be one, but not the only, 
suitable option.
71
 The complexity of the present crisis requires more flexible solutions, taking into 
account the national divergences, interests and politics still prevalent today, especially among the 
economic leaders.  
In a union of growing asymmetries, the financial crisis is only making things worse. The recent 
Cyprus bailout – the fifth in the Eurozone in only three years – was yet another expression of the 
deeper political rather than merely financial chasm
72
 developing between the North and the South of 
Europe. With the latter losing competitiveness and the former gaining it, the division between 
creditors and debtors, and the disturbing absence of trust among Eurozone members coupled with poor 
decision-making mechanisms have created an explosive mix that is threatening the Union per se. The 
Eurozone crisis is only ringing initial warning bells and serves to expose the growing fragmentation 
that may end up dividing the European Union into Central and the Periphery.
73
 
Greece is no saint itself, either. With decades of accumulated sins, despite its considerable 
achievements it remains a country with very big issues: Huge tax evasion, a persistent lack of reforms, 
an enormous counter-productive public sector, to name only a few. And, worst of all, impunity.
74
 Such 
internal issues however cannot be handled more efficiently at the national level. Here is the tricky part: 
Greek negative externalities will be imposed on fellow Eurozone citizens who, until the spread of the 
financial crisis, benefitted from the Euro at no cost. Now German or Finnish taxpayers, far remote 
from Greece’s issues, are nevertheless being asked to assume its costs. As Krugman remarks, in a non-
federation, financial issues of one state cannot be resolved by other states without a single 
government. The common currency cannot work without mutualisation of debt. 
Thus the tragedy: Greece may be a victim of its own vices, but it is principally the victim of European 
failures. Greek citizens, young and old, when faced with unpredictable chaos voted for bailouts, 
avoided uncertainty and gave the green light to a short-term coalition government. Plunging into debt, 
the alternatives for the majority of Greek voters were nowhere to be seen. A democracy with no 
alternatives is a fatal democracy . The Greek elections were only a by-product of this tragedy.     
                                                     
69 Charles Grant, Is Europe Doomed to Fail as a Power?, Center for European Reform Essays, July 2009. Contra the 
overoptimistic views of the likes of Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream, 2004, Polity, 197-233.   
70 Sergio Fabbrini, as above, 57, 37-42. According to Fabbrini, the EU lacks a founding political document and thus a 
political justification. It is a ‘compound democracy by necessity’, not a democracy ‘by design’.  
71 Giandomenico Majone, Patterns of Post-National Europe: The Future of Integration after the Crisis of Monetary Union, 
Paper presented at the 4th Annual Conference, ‘Democracy and Law in Europe’, CoE in Foundations of European Law 
and Polity Research, Helsinki, Finland, September 27-28 2012 (arguing that the traditional ‘one-size-fits-all’ philosophy 
of European governance led to the pathologies of the EMU). 
72 Lessons from Cyprus: Euro Crisis Poses Graves Dangers to EU Unity, Spiegel, March 25, 2013.  
73 Giandomenico Majone, Monetary Union and the Politicization of Europe, Keynote Speech at the EuroAcademica 
International Conference “The EU and the Politicization of Europe”, Vienna, Dec. 2011, who argues that, instead of 
uniting Europe, the Euro will sadly end up dividing it into four different camps (‘the members of the Eurozone; the de 
jure opt outs; the de facto opt outs; and the drop-outs’).  
74 As Takis Pappas puts it well, ‘For decades, Greeks were allowed to act illegally against the state’s interests with no 
punishment- through rampant tax evasion, unauthorized construction, pension fraud and legislative immunity’. See the 
insider’s analysis of Takis Pappas, Why Greece Failed, as above, 35. 
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The Aftermath: WHY ask the WHY Question  
Finally, we get to WHY we are asking these WHY Questions to resolve this national political puzzle. 
What is the added value of these queries for our research in the midst of a crisis? The WHY questions, 
in our case, have aided us see the four different angles – some obvious, some not – of our subject, thus 
helping us investigate it more thoroughly.   
The 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections had for us four different dimensions. First, there was an 
internal political dimension as the outcome of political destabilization and rising extremism in crisis-
hit Greece. Second, there was an external political dimension because the results would send varying 
signals to other parliaments and to the country’s creditors. Third, a fundamental systemic dimension: 
The elections showed national reactions to the legitimacy crisis of European democracy. And most 
importantly, it had an ethical dimension – the elections exposed the fatality of direct democracy in 
sovereign-debt-ridden countries.  
The four dimensions are interconnected. European systemic problems influence, as shown, national 
political choices: Political destabilisation may go hand-in-hand with foreign-driven austerity and the 
European legitimacy crisis only strengthens national sentiments
75
 previously neglected at the cost of 
pro-European ones. 
But national political distrust predated the EU political distrust. That, we knew beforehand. Such 
distrust has to do with the modern crisis of representative democracy at all levels, from local to global. 
In an era where decisions are increasingly taken externally, beyond the state, the notion of democracy 
itself is challenged every day. As such, a wider politicisation of Europe
76
, though required, may not 
necessarily do the trick.   
The act of voting is, at the end of the day, an act of citizenship. But it is also the most essential such 
act. How we vote denotes our choices in a specific historical moment. The outcome and significance 
of an election varies depending on the reality in which it takes place. That is why it made sense to ask 
the WHY questions: These questions made us more alert of that reality. 
 
                                                     
75 And calls for the emergence of new forms of governance of the Eurozone. See, e.g., Stefan Collignon, The Governance of 
European Public Goods, June 2011, online at http://www.stefancollignon.de. 
76 See, e.g., Miguel Maduro, A New Governance for the EU and the Euro: Democracy and Justice, RSCAS Policy Paper 
2012/11 (proposing a new political and social justification of the EU project through the emergence-and empowerment- 
of a European political space to complement the national ones). 
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Introduction 
Courts take decisions. These decisions are based on reasons. 
This conventional wisdom constitutes a proposition which sounds familiar to all of us, one we grew 
deeply accustomed to in the course of our legal socialisation. It is against this background that the 
thesis suggested by the course convenors of the WHY-seminar stirred up considerable perplexity 
among the participants: Perhaps courts should not provide any reasoning for their decisions at all. 
The debate in the seminar room quickly revealed that a number of inconvenient problems arise from 
our seemingly innocent initial statement. If we are to believe that courts, through the exercise of legal 
reasoning, come to a certain conclusion (the decision), it might seem puzzling that they sometimes 
reason their decisions, but sometimes do not. Sometimes they give us all of their reasons to take a 
certain decision, sometimes they give us only some of them. Even more disturbingly, sometimes they 
explicitly give us a set of reasons that are not the true driving factor behind their decision, i.e. other 
reasons have determined the outcome. 
Here, at the very latest, a shade of existential angst enters the stage. There seems to be something 
disturbing about this inconsistent practice of the judiciary. In a legal-therapeutical exercise, we might 
try to explore its foundations: Why does the reason-conundrum leave us so baffled? 
Traditionally, we believe reasoning to be the necessary and essential middle part between facts and 
outcome. The work of courts, on this account, is a three-step exercise:  
facts          reasoning          outcome 
Reasoning means recognising all relevant legal sources, such as norms, customs and precedents, which 
are, by way of interpretation, translated into a rule that solves the legal problem at stake through 
application to the facts. Reasoning, thus, is a rational process which converts the more general legal 
sources into the answer for the concrete legal dispute.  
When engaging in legal scholarship, we often mimic this process in reverse: We take the outcome of a 
case and examine whether, by means of reasoning, the relevant legal sources justify the transformation 
of the facts into the particular outcome. We pretend, in a way, to be the court in the relevant case, too. 
Against this background, it becomes apparent why the ambiguities connected with legal reasoning 
(rightly) bother us. If courts do not treat reasoning as seriously as we do, or assign a different role to it, 
we face a major problem. We do not really understand the object of our study. The question is as 
simple as it is crucial: What do courts really do? Or, to re-formulate it in the context of the European 
Union: What does the Court of Justice really do? 
The margin of appreciation doctrine in the Court’s case-law on Member State restrictions of free 
movement rights will serve as an example for our inquiry. We will see that the answer to the above 
question has significant consequences not only for the methodology but also for the final result of an 
analysis of the phenomenon. Our starting point is the traditional view sketched above. To 
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conceptualise the margin of appreciation, in accordance with that account, means to identify a set of 
legal criteria inherent to EU primary law that can explain the use of this doctrine by the Court in 
different factual scenarios. 
Hereinafter, a sketch of how this approach must change once its foundations have been challenged will 
be drawn. In a first step, we will re-think our perception on the role of the Court as a mere reason-
processor and stress its creational role for law (II.). Then, we will turn to examine the limited role of 
explicit reasoning within the work of courts (III.). Finally, we will make the case for an approach 
incorporating more than only legal reasons, which will help us to deal with judicial decisions more 
adequately (IV.). 
Discovering versus Creating: Court Action as Choice  
It is a truism that there is often more than one answer to a legal question. As lawyers, we know that 
this is due to several factors inherent to law such as the vagueness of legal language, the possibility of 
gaps in the legal system, and collisions of different norms.
77
 It is instructive, in this regard, to note that 
legal vocabulary tends to speak about ‘persuasive’ rather than ‘right’ answers.78 
Against this background, it seems surprising that one fundamental feature of the work of courts has, so 
far, only rarely been taken into account by European Law scholars: The element of choice. 
Mainstream legal thinking still perceives courts as recognising or discovering rather than creating law. 
This way of thinking is, in fact, deeply enrooted in our legal tradition, dating back as far as to the 
French Revolution’s distrust towards the adjudicative process (‘le juge est la bouche de la loi’), and 
has found its way to modern constitutional law reformulated in concepts such as the separation of 
powers and the rule of law. The logic is simple: Judges, by means of legal reasoning, discover the 
correct outcome of a case, i.e. the one embodied in the legal sources.   
The European project and the Court of Justice as one of its central figures is just one example of how 
far from adequate this picture is. We have witnessed plenty of moments of choice in the Court’s case-
law. Among the best-discussed ones are principles such as direct effect,
79
 supremacy
80
 and 
fundamental rights protection.
81
 Why do these principles constitute instances of choice? The above 
decisions were only one of at least two equally possible outcomes (positive or negative); on the basis 
of the available legal sources and means of interpretation, the Court could have equally decided to 
introduce or not to introduce the relevant principle. The Treaties had remained silent on all of these 
matters, and different arguments could have been and were indeed advanced to back up either 
position. A choice, thus, had to be made. At least on a theoretical level, it seems far from impossible to 
imagine the EU working without the above features, which now form part of its constitutional DNA. 
When authors sympathetic to the Court’s case-law comment on these issues by saying ‘it was all in the 
Treaties’, this creates a fiction of logical deduction, i.e. it makes it sound as if, in fact, there was only 
one option and not two (or even more). This fiction, despite having the ‘noble’ purpose of legitimating 
highly contested decisions, has an unfortunate drawback: It denies the creative and creational role the 
Court of Justice has had throughout the past six decades 
The term ‘judicial activism’ that pervades debates of this kind is therefore somewhat misleading. It 
makes it sound as if courts, by making a choice and thus creating law, stepped out of their regular role. 
                                                     
77 cf. Robert Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Suhrkamp 1983) 17. 
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The opposite is true. To think of courts as merely applying prefabricated solutions to legal disputes 
would fundamentally undervalue their place in the institutional construct. Miguel Maduro writes that 
‘when the Court is called upon to hear a case it must make a decision’.82 We might paraphrase this 
sentence to state our point: When the Court is called upon to hear a case it must (often) make a 
choice.
83
  
The interplay between the margin of appreciation and the principle of proportionality illustrates this 
point. A lot of academic effort has been put into clarifying and delineating the tenets of proportionality 
analysis as used by the Court of Justice. The result is a fairly broad consensus on conceptualising 
proportionality as a four-stage inquiry: Legitimate aim, suitability, necessity and proportionality 
strictu sensu (balancing).
84
  
Once provided with this relatively clear set of requirements, we might be tempted to use it as an 
explanation for the whole of the Court of Justice’s case-law. We will quickly discover that the Court – 
despite constantly invoking the above test
85
 – occasionally does not engage in the balancing exercise,86 
refrains from double-checking the suitability of a national regulatory framework,
87
 or leaves the 
decision regarding the necessity of a policy measure to the relevant Member State.
88
 These deviations 
are symptoms of the margin of appreciation, and they lead to different levels of scrutiny. The fewer 
questions examined by the Court of Justice itself, the lower the intensity of judicial review. The 
divergence in use of the supposedly same test, i.e. proportionality analysis, might seem to be 
paradoxical at first sight. A common line of criticism has therefore been to point out that the Court is 
being inconsistent or, even worse, is simply wrong. As a mere processor of reasons it should have 
taken the facts and simply put them through the four stages of the proportionality-test identified above. 
We might, however, turn the vice into a virtue. The proportionality-hodgepodge shows all too well 
that the Court makes a choice every time it carries out the scrutiny of a Member State act. Even a 
seemingly clear and rigid test such as proportionality is, in fact, fairly flexible, and the Court uses this 
flexibility in order to vary its activity. 
The choice-based perspective, this way, radically changes the approach to phenomena such as the 
margin of appreciation. Had we thought that the case law was an attempt of the Court of Justice to 
deduce a doctrine from the legal sources available to it, our focus must necessarily be altered now. The 
Court moves from being a mere mechanical device discovering the margin of appreciation to the 
creator and (selective) user of this tool; it is the institution which, when examining national 
regulations, chooses to apply or not to apply it.  
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86 Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505. 
87 Regarding the consistency and systematicity requirement, which the Court of Justice locates in its assessment of the 
suitability of the regulation at stake, cf. Case C-262/02 Commission v France (Loi Evin) [2004] ECR I-6569; Case C-
429/02 Bacardi France [2004] ECR I-6613.  
88 Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa [2007] ECR I-7633. 
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Reasoning versus Reasons 
Having explored the possibility of varying judicial outcomes, we can now turn to the question of legal 
reasoning. We had, at the outset, identified legal reasoning as the necessary middle part between facts 
and outcome. 
If reasoning is so central to the work of courts, we might be baffled by the role and use of reasoning in 
judgments. Already in our introductory remarks, we have seen that reasoning is far from being a 
constant and coherently used element in legal decisions. Just as its extent varies (how many reasons 
are made explicit, how detailed is the reasoning etc.), the issue of whether reasoning is given at all 
varies from case to case.  
We might feel dissatisfied with this situation. If law is supposed to be guiding social behaviour,
89
 
offering no reasons can seriously undermine this function. It would make a huge difference for me as a 
plaintiff to know what the courts – in similar cases to mine – have actually based their judgments on, 
i.e. which particular element of the facts has influenced the outcome. Reasoning makes it both possible 
to describe existing and predict future case-law. 
In light of our findings in the previous part of this paper, we may find the sloppy handling of reasoning 
even more deplorable. If court action is characterised by choice, we should get to know how the 
relevant choices come about. If judges move from being mere legal craftsmen to part-time legislators, 
we should require even more from them than traditional legal reasoning. We might go with Neil 
MacCormick and call for ‘second-order justifications’, i.e. the justification for taking ‘choices between 
rival possible rulings’.90 This would be a normative statement directed towards courts.  
The problem with telling courts what they should do is that they might follow our advice, or they 
might not. A look at the case law relating to the margin of appreciation is instructive in this regard. 
When, in Schmidberger, the Court of Justice grants the Member States a ‘wide margin of discretion’91 
to reconcile the free movement of goods and the freedom of assembly, and thereby strongly modifies 
its standard proportionality test, it does not provide us with any reason for this move. While 
underlining the ‘moral, religious or cultural’ sensitiveness of gambling as an explicit reason for 
introducing a margin of appreciation in Schindler,
92
 the Court does not even mention this aspect in 
many other cases turning on morally contested and culturally sensitive areas, such as collective action 
(Viking Line,
93
 Laval
94
), national security (Dory
95
) or prostitution (Jany
96
).    
As the Court of Justice proves not to be receptive to our suggestion, we might try another move. 
Instead of deliberating on the consequences of our choice-based view for courts and their reasoning, 
we might address the role of another actor: us, as legal scholars. 
Let us take the extreme case of Schmidberger in which no reasoning was provided. Are we supposed 
to think that there simply were no reasons in this case regarding the question ‘strict proportionality 
versus margin of appreciation’? Did the Court simply flip a coin? Given the numerous examples of 
strict scrutiny of national free movement restrictions in previous case law, and the large amount of 
possible arguments for either option, it would be bizarre to think that the Court of Justice did not think 
at all about why to refrain from the balancing exercise and entrust it to the Member State authorities.  
                                                     
89 cf. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (OUP 1979). 
90 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon 1978) 101.  
91 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, para 82. 
92 Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, para 60. 
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To be sure, this would not sit easily with our basic assumptions about the adjudicative process in 
general either. Taking a decision in a legal dispute is, to a large extent, a reflected act. Facts and 
outcomes are not randomly cobbled together; if we did not care about a certain type of link between 
them, we might also entrust the work of judges to slot machines. Although many academic 
commentators seem to think so occasionally, court decisions, even if not accompanied by formal 
reasoning, are not reasonless. Only looking at the formal reasoning might, however, mean not looking 
wide enough. 
The bottom line of our findings is simple: Reasoning does not necessarily equal reasons. Underneath 
the explicit line of arguments which appears in the judgment (reasoning), there might be a variety of 
other factors the court found to be relevant for the determination of its decision (reasons). To put it 
differently, there is a world beyond reasoning. This transforms legal scholarship into the observer of a 
play, parts of which take place behind the scenes. The challenge is: We do not have a backstage pass. 
Taking Courts Seriously 
Leaving the realm of explicit or formal reasoning creates an important follow-up problem for us. If we 
had we dwelled safely in the relatively clearly delineated universe of legal reasons as determinants of 
court decisions before, we need to face the question of boundaries now. We can think of various 
factors – political, social and psychological, just to name a few – that might possibly be relevant for 
the outcome of a judgment taken by a court. But which are the ones of possible significance for us? At 
what features could and should our inquiry be directed?   
A first, obvious possibility might be to conceive of reasons, even those not made explicit in the 
relevant judgment, as being limited to what are commonly held to be legal reasons, i.e. legal sources 
and methods of interpretation. On this account, courts, even if they did not always tell us about it, 
would be engaging in a fully-fledged reasoning exercise including, but also limited to the legal reasons 
relevant to the case at play. They would consider and weigh arguments such as the wording of a 
provision, the intention of the legislature and the coherence with other norms within the legal system. 
Any factor beyond the sphere of the strictly legal would have no role in this picture.  
A conception along these lines would strongly overestimate the importance of the legal (so defined). A 
famous study conducted by Segal and Spaeth – exemplary for many of its kind – has shown a 71 % 
correlation between political views of U.S. Supreme Court judges and their opinions in selected 
areas.
97
 We might argue that 71 % means that this factor alone cannot account for all decisions taken
98
; 
it would, however, be presumptuous to think we could simply ignore it. When the Court of Justice in 
Keck and Mithouard almost explicitly communicates that it feels overloaded with the amount of cases 
it needs to deal with under the provision of free movement of goods,
99
 we are outside the realm of 
classic legal argumentation.
100
 When in Grogan
101
 the case is dismissed on the basis of a very narrow 
the scope of application of the freedom to provide services, it is almost tangible that factors other than 
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legal ones have determined the outcome. There is a lesson to be learned from this: If we want to take 
courts seriously, we must move beyond the strictly legal.
102
 
Having said this, let us return yet another time to Schmidberger. Against the background of the above, 
we might re-think the possible determinants for the Court’s decision. Within the sphere of standard 
legal reasoning, the following reasons can be recognised: The objective of the Treaties to create an 
internal market tells us to interpret derogations from free movement rights narrowly; the established 
case-law on free movement speaks in favour of a strict proportionality-test; on the other hand, the 
Treaties make clear that fundamental rights protection is equally important in the EU; also, national 
diversity has a standing under European Law to some extent.  
All of these reasons are valid and should be taken into account by us. However, our inquiry cannot 
stop at this point. We need to go further and include other possible factors: Did the Court think that the 
national authorities were better equipped to assess the question? Was it convinced that they were, in 
general, doing a good job in protecting fundamental rights? Did the Court trust the referring court in 
this respect? Would it have had the time and resources to substantially examine the question? Who 
rendered the decision, the Great Chamber or a 5-judge chamber (and which judges were involved)? 
And perhaps we should, even in continental Europe, go as far as asking: have the judges been 
predominantly right-wing or left-wing, euro-sceptic or euro-enthusiast? 
With great certainty, not all of these factors had an equal role in determining the outcome of this 
particular case and in shaping the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in general. The relative 
significance of issues such as the judges’ political attitude or workload is likely to substantially vary 
on different occasions. Also, we should not fall into the trap of over-correction: More traditional legal 
arguments and considerations might have a significant role in many cases. The relationship between 
legal and extra-legal reasons should therefore be thought of as being one of heterarchy rather than of 
hierarchy. In the end, it is this patchwork picture we have to face when analysing the activity of the 
adjudicative process. Despite the complexity caused by this, the important point is that both realms 
are, to a variable extent, relevant for the outcome of judicial decisions, and must therefore be taken 
into account. 
 
* 
*   * 
We have come a long way. Let us recapitulate. We had started off by believing that we could logically 
deduce a doctrine such as the margin of appreciation from the available and relevant legal sources by 
means of legal reasoning. By abandoning the view of the Court’s role as a mere reason-processor, and 
ceasing to limit our inquiry to the explicit reasoning given in the case-law, we ended up with an 
approach which equally recognises legal and extra-legal reasons as potential determinants of court 
decisions of diverging relative significance. It seems we have come full circle: Our initial statement is 
valid, but in a different way from how we might have expected it to be. Courts do take decisions, and 
these decisions are based on reasons. Their range, however, is much broader than the formal reasoning 
provided in most judgments could make us believe, a fact which must have implications for our work 
as observers, commentators and critics of the judiciary.  
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It is this very issue which seems to have raised the biggest controversy among the participants of the 
seminar. If all of the above is true, should we perhaps inquire into what judges had for breakfast rather 
than into which statute book they apply? Although we might venture the guess that food habits of 
judges are unlikely to influence the outcome of court decisions in a considerable way, the crucial point 
of this essay was to show that we would be wrong in categorically ruling out their relevance and that 
of other extra-legal factors. This surely makes our task more complicated given the sheer width of 
possible determinants. There is, however, no reason to believe that legal scholarship would be in 
principle unfit for this project and could not, on the basis of a trial-and-error approach which is 
common to many other disciplines, progressively identify the most relevant factors in this respect. If 
we long for the most adequate picture of what courts do, this burdensome exercise is unavoidable.
  25  
‘WHY EFFICIENCY?’: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR AN EXPLORATORY ACCOUNT OF 
DEFAULT RULES AS ‘CHOREOGRAPHERS’ AND A TENTATIVE CONCEPT OF REGULATORY 
CONTRACTUALISATION103 
Lécia Vicente
* 
 
‘…no matter how free and independent man had been previously, there he was now, because of a 
multitude of new needs, subject, as it were, to all of nature and, above all, to his fellow men, to whom 
he has, in a sense, become a slave, even in becoming their master: if rich, he needs their services; if 
poor, he needs their help, and being between the two does not enable him to do without them. Thus, he 
must seek without pause to interest them in his lot and to make them discover a real or apparent profit 
for themselves in working for his’. 
 
Jean Jacques Rousseau 
Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, II. 
Abstract 
This essay is an exercise that fitted into a broader research work the author conducted for her own PhD 
dissertation. At that time, doctoral researchers at the European University Institute were challenged to 
think thoroughly about methodology in law. I accepted that challenge. As a consequence, this essay 
was first and foremost an attempt to conciliate law and economics from the spectrum of game theory. 
In this essay, I argue that existing default rules often fail to either protect shareholders from collective 
action problems inside private limited liability companies, or that they prevent shareholders from 
being able to unload their shares when desired. In other words, the weakness of particular corporate 
default rules is two-sided. Here, I focus mainly on the first side, that is to say, I address the collective 
action problem. This is demonstrated with the model of shareholders’ coordination I present herein. 
With this model, I illustrate how a collective action problem can force shareholders to sell lower than 
their total valuation of the company because they believe others will sell and, thus, they will lose 
power over the company’s future policies. At the end, I propose solutions that are meant to stimulate 
discussion about which design of default rules is more likely to overcome ownership problems 
deriving from the inefficiency of transfer of shares in private limited liability companies (PLLCs) – 
the most commonly used private units of economic development. 
Introduction 
This essay stems from a challenge I was given while I still was a doctoral researcher at the European 
University Institute. This challenge consisted of thinking about methodology in law. I began this task 
by inquiring about the method that lawyers effectively use in legal research, but in fact I was 
challenging myself to disclose my preconceptions and the values by which I was guided. This was not 
an easy task to accomplish, since mainstream ideas shape many of our preconceptions, such as those 
                                                     
103 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 29th Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and 
Economics (EALE) which was held on September 20-22, 2012 in Stockholm, Sweden at Stockholm University. I thank 
the participants for their comments. 
* Postdoctoral Research Associate and Instructor in international business and business law at the University of Illinois 
College of Business. I thank Brian Frank, one of my good students at the College of Business, for his interest in reading 
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informing the debate about efficiency in law and economics. I would not say that this sort of ‘herd 
behaviour’ that has characterised legal research in recent years is necessarily good or bad. Rather, it 
should not prevent us from asking the right questions like the following: Why efficiency? Why law 
and economics? Why should a legal researcher who has been used to the restrictive language of 
entitlement, rights and duties in contracts, rather consider assumptions of costs, benefits and tradeoffs 
in transactions? Why should one take efficiency seriously? The need to ask the right questions is 
relevant in particular because of the rising interdisciplinary scope of legal research. This is already a 
reality in countries such as the United States, where law is undertaken as a subject of postgraduate 
study.
104
 This means that students, researchers, professors and academics in general perceive it from 
different disciplinary standpoints such as business, economics, engineering, biology, psychology, 
mathematics, political sciences, history, and philosophy, among others. Additionally, there is an 
interesting phenomenon of disciplinary exchange. Legal scholars are increasingly embracing 
interdisciplinary research. In this context, not only law, but also business departments become a forum 
for discussing key contributions of legal scholars, research strategies and methodological tools. Ideas 
turn out to be versatile and are discussed in different contexts through different conceptual 
frameworks. The crux of the matter, however, is to discover the right methodological approach that is 
most likely to unveil the essence of a particular problem. In the absence of a self-sufficient legal 
method, interdisciplinary research has successfully help strip ideas from their conceptual frameworks 
and shed light on the essence of legal institutes so often crystallised in legal codes and common law. 
This situation is becoming increasingly true of legal research in Europe and the outcome is often fairly 
good. Therefore, discussing efficiency and tools normally used by law-and-economics advocates, can 
shed some light on different types of discourse fleshing out the law. Why is this important? First, it is 
important to help us overcome prejudices regarding other forms of normative arguments. Second, it is 
important because once we understand these arguments we are then freer to make our own choices as 
to how to convincingly approach our own research. 
Efficiency is a multifaceted and accordingly a complex subject. Notwithstanding the complexity of 
and the debate about the subject, I am not sceptical of conceiving efficiency as a normative standard 
for legal policy, rules and argumentation. However, I am not a worshiper of this approach either as I 
am ready to put into question the reasons normally advanced in favour of efficiency-based 
reasoning.
105
 I believe that the key point is honesty and, therefore, to state clearly that an underpinning 
concept of efficiency motivates a particular research. In this essay, I adopt a particular concept of 
efficiency regarding the transfer of shares of private limited liability companies (PLLCs) when there 
are problems of collective action inside such companies. These problems can force shareholders to sell 
their shares at a value lower than that at which the shares are worth. This occurs because shareholders 
believe that others will sell and, as a consequence, if they do not subsequently also sell, they will lose 
power over the future policies of the company. Thus, for me, a transfer of shares improves efficiency 
if it increases the combined players’ utilities under new ownership, or in other words, the overall 
utilities in the company. I claim that efficient ownership rules maximise utility in the economy. I ask: 
why efficiency as a normative legal standard? Because, according to the ownership model I am 
presenting, efficiency matters. 
My analysis is based on a number of case-studies that I collected to write my PhD dissertation. They 
are decisions regarding un-consented transfers of shares adjudicated by high courts in two Southern 
                                                     
104 See Garoupa, Nuno and Ulen, Thomas S., ‘The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the 
United States’, Alabama Law Review, vol. 59, 2008, pp. 1555-1633. 
105 For instance, see Coleman, Jules L., ‘Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization’, Hofstra Law Review, vol. 8, 1979,  
pp. 509-551 (criticising the various normative strategies for defending the pursuit of Pareto efficiency standards. 
Furthermore, Coleman states that even if Paretianism constitutes an adequate moral theory, it does not follow from the 
adoption of efficiency as a goal that every agent or actor, regardless of his or her institutional role and the conditions or 
facts that determine his or her course of action, has the obligation or authority to promote efficiency). 
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European countries, Italy and Portugal. Research undertaken thus far has revealed that ownership rules 
do not efficiently regulate transfers of shares in PLLCs. Most of these rules are default rules, that is, 
rules designed by legislatures and from which investors may opt out when drafting their firms’ 
contractual framework. This contractual framework is often referred to as the articles of association or 
articles of incorporation. At a certain point, shareholders of these firms have problems combining their 
actions. First, there is an inherent status quo that shareholders desire to maintain in PLLCs. 
Shareholders, therefore, do not contract around default rules regulating their ownership rights, even 
when that would be desirable. Second, shareholders often do not understand or know the rule-set they 
have chosen (probably because they have been badly advised). As a result, shareholders frequently 
transfer their shares in breach of their firms’ contractual framework that is based on the default rules 
they have not opted out from. My goal is, by making considerations about the efficiency of these 
ownership rules, to set up a research agenda in corporate law that thinks of default rules as nudging 
mechanisms or ‘choreographers’.106 They would have the ability – as choreographers – to make 
shareholders coordinate their actions in an organic fashion, and in this way, improve the efficiency of 
ownership of shares held in these companies.  
This essay is organised as follows. Section two relates the research agenda proposed with the debate 
on economic efficiency. It also includes an account of Olson’s theory and the collective action 
problems it addresses, and applies that theory by analogy to PLLCs, especially when they have a 
considerable dimension. Section three presents a model of a game to illustrate the problem of 
shareholders’ coordination in these companies. Section four suggests a new concept of regulatory 
contractualisation to overcome inefficient regulatory alternatives preserved by national legislation. 
This concept is closely linked to the exploratory account of defaults as choreographers I additionally 
present in this essay. I claim that, as choreographers, ownership rules with the legal form of default 
rules should have an enabling capacity to coordinate actions of the members of these firms, 
particularly when they act simultaneously or also are part of the firm’s management body. Section five 
concludes. 
The Efficiency Debate: Some bread-and-butter considerations and the Olson problem in private 
limited liability companies 
There are several definitions of efficiency of which the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks standards are the 
most relevant.
107
 Additionally, the so-called Coase theorem, which has been subject to countless 
academic studies,
108
 forms the fundamental basis of the theoretical analysis of efficiency of legal 
policy and rules. I will not define each of these efficiency-related concepts. This essay will not focus 
on matters referring to the philosophical foundations of law and economics. Further, I will not treat the 
opposition between positive and normative economics; neither will I take a position on the debate 
about the normative justification of efficiency as a criterion to analyse legal rules. This debate is 
mostly jurisprudential. It has been dividing authors for at least thirty years and a position cannot be 
sufficiently taken without a relevant theory of adjudication.
109
 I am inspired by the work of authors 
                                                     
106 See Gintis, Herbert in idem, ‘Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology’, The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and 
the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014 (referring to social norms as 
choreographers). 
107 For a reference to at least four concepts of efficiency - productive efficiency, Pareto optimality, Pareto superiority and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see Coleman, Jules L., cit., in particular pp. 512-514. 
108 See Polinsky, A. Mitchell, ‘The Coase Theorem’ in idem, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 3rd ed., Aspen 
Publishers, 2003, pp. 13-16. 
109 See Posner, Richard, ‘Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 8, 1979, pp. 103-
140 (119-127); Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Is Wealth a Value?’, The Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 9, 1980, pp. 191- 226  (196-
201); Kaplow, Louis, and Shavell, Steven, ‘Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income’, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 23, 1994, pp. 667-681 (667-674); Kennedy, Duncan, ‘Law-and-
Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies’, in Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
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such as Polinsky and Shavell and, therefore, I am interested in determining in the abstract what type of 
default rules would be efficient in overcoming problems of combining action of shareholders in 
PLLCs.
110
 Certainly, my analysis will have positive and normative implications as to the organisation 
of PLLCs, especially when shareholders act simultaneously in the context of a proposed acquisition of 
a share. In these circumstances, Pareto optimality is a necessary condition, but it is not the only one.  
For the purposes exposed above, I use thirty Portuguese and ten Italian court decisions as case-studies. 
These cases are related to the un-consented transfer of shares (quotas)
111
 in the Portuguese PLLC 
(sociedade por quotas) and the un-consented transfer of shares (partecipazione) in the Italian PLLC 
(società a responsabilità limitata).
112
 A transfer of shares is un-consented if the holder of that share 
sells it without the consent of the company required by the default rule provided by the legislature and 
introduced by shareholders in the firm’s articles of association. A transfer is also un-consented if its 
holder sells the share in breach of the articles of association, which foresee the consent of the company 
to that transfer, even when the law establishes a default principle of free transferability. The legal 
framework is the following. Article 228 (2) of the Portuguese Commercial Companies Code states that 
the transfer of shares between parties is binding but has no effect on the company unless it consents to 
the transfer. This means that if a purchaser buys a share in a Portuguese PLLC without the company’s 
consent, they have property rights in the share, but no rights in the company. Differently, Article 2469 
of the Italian Civil Code (Codice Civile) provides that one can freely transfer shares unless otherwise 
established by the articles of association.  
Court decisions in Italy and Portugal on disputes brought to courts by non-transferring shareholders 
against the shareholder who transferred their share without the consent of the company (or in breach of 
a particular clause of the articles providing other restrictions on the transfer) present interesting facts. 
In the Portuguese case, parties to the articles of a company often copy the default and, therefore, 
introduce restrictions on transfer of shares, namely the requirement of consent of the company and 
pre-emption rights, or rights of first refusal. In the Italian case, despite the principle of free 
transferability, shareholders normally introduce the same sort of restrictions (the requirement of 
consent or clausole di gradimento, and pre-emption rights or clausole di prelazione). Additionally, 
under the principle of free transferability, other restrictions are introduced in the articles of Italian 
PLLCs such as clauses prohibiting the pledge of shares and their usufruct (clausole impeditive e 
limitative del pegno e che limitano il godimento), and in limine clauses absolutely prohibiting any kind 
of transfer (clausole di intrasferibilità assoluta). The case law selected suggests that Italian and 
Portuguese cases have something in common. At a certain point, shareholders seem to lack incentives 
to stay in the firm and just sell their shares in breach of the restrictions imposed by the articles of 
association or contractual framework of the firm. Often, shareholders do not hold much knowledge 
about the articles and frequently do not understand them.
113
 But often shareholders still breach the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Economics and the Law, New York, 2002, pp. 469-473; Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven, ‘Fairness versus Welfare’, 
Harvard Law Review, vol. 114, 2001, pp. 961-1388.  
110 The assumption that shareholders have problems combining their actions is based on empirical work I conducted for my 
own PhD dissertation. See Vicente, Lécia, The Requirement of Consent for the Transfer of Shares and Freedoms of 
Movement: Toward the Liberalization of Private Limited Liability Companies - A Comparative Study of the Laws of 
Portugal, France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States and its Interplay with EU Law, URL: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/7088.  
111 Portuguese PLLCs’ shares are called quotas. Some writers refer in English to the private limited liability company’s 
owners as quotaholders. Nevertheless, for ease of reference, I shall refer to quotas as shares and quotaholders as 
shareholders. 
112 Using as a case study of regulatory dualism offered by another Portuguese speaking country, Brazil’s New Market (Novo 
Mercado), see Gilson, Ronald J. et al., ‘Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the 
U.S., and the European Union’, Stanford Law Review, vol. 63, 2001, pp. 475-538. 
113 It is intriguing that shareholders, despite ignoring the articles of the company, still endeavour to create the business 
association and work out their relations as members of the same company by sharing profits and taking collective 
decisions.  
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articles as a result of strategic behaviour and due to high transaction costs undermining successful 
bargaining. The rub lies in the fact that these ownership rules, that is, default rules regulating transfers 
of shares have a weak enforceability, jeopardising property rights of shareholders, namely non-
transferring shareholders, shareholders who end up unloading their shares or selling them without 
consent and at a lower market price,
114
 and the shareholder who acquires such shares.
115
 The questions 
are the following. Can default rules be structured in such a way to strengthen shareholders’ property 
rights? How much autonomy do shareholders of PLLCs need? 
Corporate law in its contractual nature has a regulatory function.
116
 In this paper, we explore the extent 
to which law can be structured to steer the actions of shareholders or members of these firms toward 
efficient solutions. By efficient solutions we mean those that are likely to overcome collective action 
problems upon a sudden change of ownership through un-consented transfer of shares. This is 
particularly important in the context of the firm, defined as a relational vehicle that has been 
historically capable of overcoming the dichotomy between ‘promise’ and ‘market’.117 
Let us suppose that one of the shareholders of a PLLC wishes to sell her share to a potential buyer 
without the company’s consent. Both parties have full information of the terms and conditions of the 
sales contract. Nevertheless, although the contract may be entered into, the fact is that the transfer of 
the share will have an effect on the company and on its shareholders, in particular because parties may 
collude to achieve the purposes established with the execution of the contract. It is paradoxical that 
shareholders who drafted the articles of association upon the incorporation of the company, and agreed 
to the introduction of the respective transfer clause in those articles, later sell their shares without the 
consent of the company. Why?  
It is assumed that members of a group of individuals or firms who share a certain interest would seek 
to further that interest. Nevertheless, as it is claimed by Olson, ‘…large groups, at least if they are 
composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest’.118 This paradox not only applies 
to governments or societies but also individuals and associated firms. Under certain circumstances, 
individuals no longer have incentives to voluntarily contribute to the support of the group or 
institutions that they belong.
119
 When incentives are present, members of groups, such as labour 
unions, professional associations, farm organisations, cartels, lobbies or collusive groups with no 
formal organisation will contribute to lobbying efforts and strive for power and control of policies for 
                                                     
114 It is up for discussion whether there is a real market for shares of private limited liability companies due to their lack of 
liquidity as opposed to the shares of corporations. 
115 If shares are sold without consent it is questionable whether the buyer is liable to become a legitimate shareholder. 
116 See Micklitz, Hans-Wolfgang, ‘The Visible Hand of European Private Law’, Yearbook of European Law, vol. 28, 1, 2009, 
pp. 3-59. 
117 See Macneil, Ian R., ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, Southern California Law Review, vol. 47, 1973, pp. 691-816 (760). 
Additionally, see Bernstein, Lisa, ‘Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis’, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law 
Journal, vol. 3, 1993, pp. 59-90 (arguing that economic theory should consider the importance of relational theory in its 
approach to default rules). 
118 See Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, New Haven 
and London, Yale University Press, 1982, p. 18. Also see Grundmann, Stefan, European Company Law: Organization, 
Finance and Capital Markets, Antwerpen; Oxford, Intersentia, 2007, p. 48 (affirming that ‘The mechanisms of collective 
action can […] lead to a situation in which action (useful to all) is not taken although its costs are lower than the accrued 
welfare effects because they are nevertheless higher than the welfare effects of each single actor’. For a reference to 
collective action problems regarding the exercise of the right to vote, see Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, ‘Limiting Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 102, 1989, 
pp. 1820-1860 (1837), footnote 28. 
119 People act in accordance with the incentives they have. This is one of the most essential ideas of economics. This idea is 
embodied in the concept of Nash Equilibrium, which is noted in a later stage of this paper. See Aumann, Robert J., ‘What 
is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?’, in Arrow, Kenneth J. and Honkapohja, Seppo (eds.), Frontiers of Economics, 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985, pp. 5-46 (43). 
Lécia Vicente 
30 
their benefit.
120
 These policies tend to be protectionist of a certain status quo, many times against or 
preventing institutional development. The outcome – institutional sclerosis,121 institutional apathy122 or 
institutional aversion to modernisation and risk – is often a pronouncement of institutional death.123 
The same is true of PLLCs. For instance, managers – who in PLLCs can also be and usually are 
partners– make sure to properly safeguard their interests and prevent the dissolution of the commercial 
association or the alteration of its structure of power through the inclusion of a new member in the 
corporation.  
The convergence of interests and promotion of homogeneity in PLLCs, made possible by the freedom 
of contract shareholders enjoy, also forms the basis for establishing restrictions on entry and 
innovation. Restrictions, including the requirement of consent, mostly ensure internal stability but end 
up contributing to the slowness of a company to make decisions and efficient bargains. These 
restrictions also facilitate demonstrations of path-dependence within the company’s structure, reduce 
the dynamism and vivacity of the company, and slow its adaptation to new market challenges 
demanding ‘new blood’, talent, capital formation and technological change.124 
Both Article 228(2) and 2469 are default rules. In this sense, freedom of contract plays an essential 
role, especially empowering shareholders to design the company’s contractual framework in light of 
their interests. However, in transfers of shares to a third party where both vendor and purchaser have 
full information of the terms and conditions of the contract, the vendor and the purchaser are more 
likely to be better off, while this makes the company and the remaining shareholders worse off.
125
 
There is no unanimity of interests on this matter. In situations such as this, whenever they occur the 
transaction will always cause damage. And, so, this scenario begs the question: Are default rules, by 
means of which parties regulate their internal and external relationships and impose restrictions on the 
entry of third parties, really efficient? 
In this paper, (in)efficiency is an assumption and not a fact.
126
 I assume that simple default rules, such 
as Article 228(2) and 2469, are rules that are not difficult to contract out of
127
 and cannot provide an 
                                                     
120 See Holmstrom, Bengt, ‘Moral Hazards in Teams’, The Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 13, 1982, pp. 324-340. 
121 See Gilson, Ronald J. et al. use this term in their article referring to public limited companies. However, I do not consider 
that the reasons inherent to the use of this expression by the authors are vested with particular features that would turn 
impracticable its use regarding PLLCs of greater dimensions. 
122 For an account of what has been called shareholder apathy and with relevant bibliographic references on this expression, 
see Grundmann, Stefan, cit., pp. 48-49 and note 54.  
123 Roberts, John, The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004 (making an interesting account of the organisational design of the firm for the purposes of performance and growth 
as the title of his book reveals. The author claims that ‘Firms that manage to be both innovative and efficient are rare’. (p. 
254). Although this is not a statement referring to the company, the author also realizes (p. 271) that conflicts inside firms 
may shift to the corporate level and the costs resulting therefrom may be much greater. Thus, besides considerations of 
organisational design which involves an active attitude of the management and strong leadership, it is essential to have a 
close look at the nature of the legal institutions which give form to the company’s legal regime and ascertain how can 
they fit the interests of the individuals and make the corporate structure as immune as possible to situations of conflicts, 
apathy or aversion to risk). 
124 As Bebchuk, Lucian Arye cit., p. 1830 puts it, ‘Corporations are long-living creatures functioning in ever-changing 
environment. New needs, novel situations, and additional information may well make somewhat different arrangements 
more efficient than those initially established’. 
125 This may not be the case, however, because it not always is possible to learn whether the sale value of the share is less as a 
result of the fact that the buyer has fewer rights in the firm. 
126 See Bratton, William W. and MacCahery, Joseph A., ‘An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: 
Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition’, Washington & Lee Law Review, vol. 54, 1997, pp. 629-686, (630) 
(suggesting that: ‘In an ideal world inquiry into the efficiency of a legal regime would require the collection and analysis 
of empirical information concerning costs and benefits’). 
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answer to the problem Olson addresses in his theory. Furthermore, the alternatives of enforcement 
chosen by companies often undercut interpretation and contractual enforcement. In fact, there is no 
institution other than the company that will police the application of default rules.
128
 On the contrary, 
these rules are subject to the bargaining power of the shareholders, in particular the majority or activist 
shareholders, who use the necessary contractual tools to amend the relevant clauses or to 
accommodate their interests. Still, requirements of unanimity or qualified majorities to amend these 
rules – which favour tacit collusion, coalition or the conduct of (unwritten) best practices inside the 
company – block the company’s development and openness, in addition to transforming those rules 
into outdated and costly ones.
129
  
Hence, the research agenda presented here includes the proposal of a concept of default rules as 
‘choreographers’ to surmount problems of combining action inside PLLCs.130 To this I now turn. 
Playing the Game: The move for shareholders’ coordination 
Olson’s theory of collective action is an extension of game theory. He argues that large numbers of 
agents involved in what are, in fact, various non-cooperative games (including the prisoner’s dilemma) 
will not have powerful enough incentives to cooperate. This is also true of PLLCs and their respective 
shareholders, especially if they are in considerable numbers. 
Problems of non-cooperation in PLLCs may be fairly illustrated with a basic game regarding transfer 
of ownership rights in shares.  
Model overview 1 
The setting is formed by a company owned by some of the players. The fundamental valuation of the 
company varies across players and can be high (H), medium (M) or low (L) where H > M > L. In 
addition, the company pursues one of two policies A or B. The player who prefers policy A (B) 
obtains utility A (B) (abusing notation) if this policy is pursued, and 0 from the other policy. A player 
type is denoted by her fundamental valuation and preferred policy is denoted through a subscript. At 
(Contd.)                                                                  
127 For a reference to ‘strong default rules’, i.e., rules fulfilling determined corporate formalities and which are therefore hard 
to contract out of, see Ayres, Ian and Gertner, Robert, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules’, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, 1989, pp. 87-130 (120), footnote 141. 
128 This institution could be the legislature, a national or a European institution such as the Court (promoting jurisdictional 
competition), agencies or even delegated professional bodies, which would supply and provide for the interpretation of 
standard-form articles of association of PLLCs, including the transfer clause, to face the costs resulting from the 
applicability of default rules. Referring to the legal institution responsible for designing limits on midstream opt-outs (e.g. 
legislatures – federal or state – courts or agencies), see Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, cit., p. 1851, note 50. Referring to the 
delegation to a third party – the state – the task to reform public traded companies’ articles (although these articles are 
formed by default statutory rules) through statutory amendments or court decisions whenever it is necessary to assure the 
readjustment of long-term relational contracts which form the basis of company law, see Hansmann, Henry, ‘Corporation 
and Contract’, American Law and Economics Review, vol. 8, 2006, pp., 1-19. Hansmann considers that this theory of 
‘delegated contracting’ explains why public traded corporations in the U.S. hardly ever deviate from default statutory law 
in their articles of association although they are free to do so. Strangely enough, legal provisions seem to be far better at 
adapting to new circumstances than contract terms. 
129 See Gilson, Ronald J. et al., cit., pp. 44-45.  
130See Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organisation’, The American 
Economic Review, vol. 62, 1972, pp. 777-795. These authors propose a theory of the firm in which one would assume the 
position of a monitor induced by the desire to have efficient means to reduce shirking and make team production 
economical. For a theory of defaults, it is also worth reading the ground-breaking article of Ayres, Ian and Gertner, 
Robert, cit. at 126, and more recently Ben-Shahar, Omri, ‘Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules’ Columbia Law 
Review, vol. 109, 2009, pp. 396-430. The author proposes a criterion – the ‘bargaining-mimicking gap filler’ – to create 
defaults based in the mimic of the will of the party with the power to dictate. 
Lécia Vicente 
32 
the outset, there are three shareholders (potential sellers) who prefer policy A given by HA; MA; LA. 
There are also three (potential) buyers who prefer policy B given by HB; MB; LB. 
Model overview 2 
At any given time all shareholders and buyers meet randomly in pairs (simultaneous exogenous 
matching process). Everybody observes who meets whom. Buyers simultaneously make offers to 
shareholders who simultaneously decide to accept or reject their respective offers. If the offer is 
accepted, property rights in the share are transferred to the buyer who becomes a shareholder (B type 
shareholder). If the offer is rejected, no property rights in the share are transferred and the potential 
seller remains a shareholder (A type shareholder). I also assume that the company policy chosen by its 
members automatically becomes the preferred policy of the majority expressed by majority vote. It is 
assumed that types prefer their policy type, that is type As prefer policy A and vice-versa. As to the 
players’ strategies, the buyer’s strategy is to pay a price for the share that can be conditioned on the 
shareholder type. The seller’s strategy is a mapping from the space of all possible offers into a 
decision set given by ‘accept’ or ‘reject’. If a player receives an offer that makes her indifferent as to 
whether sell or not sell her shares, I assume that she sells. The equilibrium concept is Nash 
Equilibrium. In other words, equilibrium in this game is given by a set of strategies under which each 
player type is weakly better off than from any other possible strategy given the strategies used by the 
other players.  
Model overview 3 
The player’s utilities are equal to the valuation plus policy of the company (where applicable) if a 
player owns a share. No ownership implies utility equal to zero regardless of the policy. When shares 
are traded, the player who sells gets a utility equal to the sale price and the buyer gets utility equal to 
valuation plus policy minus the purchase price. As stated above, I assume that a transfer of shares is 
efficiency improving if the combined players’ utilities are increased under new ownership. 
I now provide three examples illustrating the problem with default rules. 
Example 1: In Nash Equilibrium the company policy changes to B.  
The company valuation assumptions are the following:  
HA = 5; MA = 3; LA = 1; HB = 6; MB = 4; LB = 2. 
The policy valuations are as follows:  
A = B = 2. 
The matching assumptions are:  
LA ↔ MB, MA ↔ HB, HA ↔ LB. 
The equilibrium offers by buyers are:  
MB offers 3, HB offers 5, LB offers anything below 5. 
The equilibrium shareholder responses are:  
LA and MA sell, HA does not sell. 
This implies that the company policy becomes B. This also means that the transfer is efficiency 
improving since the total utility increases from 15 to 19. Lemma: above matching assumption implies 
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that any share transfer is always efficiency improving as long as buyers’ fundamental valuations 
exceed shareholders’ combined valuation (fundamental valuation plus policy).131 
Example 2a: Efficiency increasing policy shift to B 
The company valuation assumptions are as follows: 
HA = 5; MA = 3; LA = 1; HB = 5; MB = 3; LB = 1. 
Policy valuations are: 
A = B = 3 
The matching assumptions are the following: 
LA ↔ MB, MA ↔ HB, HA ↔ LB 
In equilibrium offers by buyers are: 
MB offers 4, HB offers 6, LB offers anything below 5. 
In equilibrium shareholders’ responses are:  
LA and MA sell, HA does not sell. 
The outcome is efficiency improving since the overall utility is increased from 18 to 19. 
Example 2b: Efficiency decreasing policy shift to B 
The company valuation assumptions are:  
HA = 5; MA = 3; LA = 1; HB = 5; MB = 3; LB = 1 
Policy valuations are the following: 
A = 5; B = 4 
The matching assumptions are as follows: 
LA ↔ MB, MA ↔ HB, HA ↔ LB 
In equilibrium, offers by buyers are: MB offers 6, HB offers 8, LB offers anything below 5. 
In equilibrium, shareholders’ responses are:  
LA and MA sell, HA does not sell 
In this situation, the outcome is inefficient since the overall utility decreased from 24 to 21. 
Example 3: 2 types of equilibria 
In this case, the company valuation assumptions are as follows:  
HA = 5; MA = 3; LA = 1; HB = 5; MB = 3; LB = 1 
Policy valuations are:  
A = B = 2 
Matching assumptions are the following:  
                                                     
131 Since HA never sells in equilibrium she ‘anchors’ the share price above fundamental share valuation. 
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LA ↔ LB, MA ↔MB, HA ↔ HB 
In equilibrium, offers by buyers are:  
LB offers 1, MB offers 3, HB offers 5 
In equilibrium, shareholder’s responses are: 1) all shareholders sell; 2) no shareholders sell. In these 
circumstances efficiency remains unaffected regardless of response. 
In examples 1 and 2a, MA and LA completely disregard HA’s benefits, since the overall benefits arising 
from the transactions are much higher. In such circumstances, default rules are of little use, since both 
MA and LA will act as rational individuals so as to maximise their personal benefits, regardless if HA 
evaluates the company so high. In both situations, HB and MB have a dominant action, which is to 
offer MA+A and LA +A respectively. This implies that the company will be under control of B types 
and policy B will be chosen in stage 2.  
Example 2b illustrates an efficiency decreasing policy shift to policy B, which makes the general 
economy worse off. This is the case because all buyers are offering below the total valuation of their 
counterparties (valuation plus policy). This, however, does not prevent MA and LA from selling. They 
sell because they are indifferent to the choice between selling and not selling. The problem is that HA 
is left with her shares but does not value the new policy (B). 
Revisiting example 3, I could make other choices about this model, such as endogenise a matching 
protocol so that buyers could freely decide which shareholder to make an offer to. For example, let us 
assume an offer structure exactly as in example 3. Would any player have a unilaterally profitable 
deviation? Take, for instance, player HB. If she decides to make an offer to another shareholder, she 
faces a higher minimum price because it is now common knowledge that HA will not sell since she 
has no offer. This implies that MB's offer will be rejected and company policy will remain A. These 
two effects make HB indifferent to keeping her proposed offer to HA and making an offer to LA 
because deviation to his initial offer to HA will not be profitable. Using the same type of argument for 
MB implies that there is no profitable deviation from the initially proposed buyer offers. This 
argument does not rule out the existence of other equilibria though. 
For instance, let us imagine that MA does not want to sell her share. As a result she commits not to sell 
her share (perhaps through a deposit of some type) to convince the other shareholders to hold on and 
wait for the offer of a better price or not to sell their shares at all.  If she – the coordinator132 – can 
convince others in advance that she will not sell, then the only equilibrium outcome is one where all 
type As retain ownership of their shares. It may be that the signal she is sending is disregarded, and all 
type A owners decide to sell because they have alternatives with higher payoffs. But it may also be that 
no type A owners sell their shares because they decide to follow that signal, especially if the 
alternatives are equally valuable. This is the essence of a correlated equilibrium.133 
I have tried to show with the examples above (e.g. HB > MA +A and MB > LA + A) that defaults are 
not efficient regulatory instruments. They cannot prevent owners from selling. However, this does not 
mean that the role of the legislator is sterile. It depends on whether the way defaults are designed will 
determine costs owners are not willing to bear if they breach them.  
                                                     
132I call her coordinator because MA coordinates in these circumstances simultaneous collective action. 
133This concept was first created by Aumann in 1974. For a later development of his theory and the well-known theorem of 
Aumann, see Aumann, Robert J., ‘Correlated Equilibrium and an Expression of Bayesian Rationality’, Econometrica, 
vol. 55 1987, pp. 1-18. 
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A Tentative Concept of Regulatory Contractualisation and an Exploratory Account of Default 
Rules as Choreographers 
To overcome situations in which shareholders’ property rights are weak and enforceability of default 
rules is not strong, this paper presents a tentative concept of regulatory contractualisation. With this 
concept, I try to address not only the cases where shareholders want to overcome barriers preventing 
them to leave the company, but also the cases where shareholders do not want to sell their shares but 
have to. This regulatory alternative is drawn as a component of an overall concept of contract, or in 
other words, it forms the basis to induce the formation of distinct subtypes of contracts or contractual 
arrangements.
134
 The legislature would assume the role of a choreographer when providing default 
rules; it would know what challenges shareholders have to deal with in the set of PLLCs and the 
hurdles they have to overcome when their property rights are not strongly defined. The choreographer, 
according to the circumstances, knows what will be the probable move of the other players
135
 and 
sends out a public signal to boost a consistent investment in these companies. This public sign could 
be given in the form of adjusted corporate default rules with the ability to play the role of 
choreographers themselves. Nevertheless, it is not clear that legislatures can devise optimal default 
rules for all situations. 
Concluding Remarks  
When the contractual framework of firms, which often assumes the form of articles of association or 
articles of organisation, is incomplete, shareholders can always design other contractual frameworks 
and adapt them to their interests and needs. However, because contracting is costly – and investors in 
these companies may not have enough funding or may not want to spend it on better contracts – 
shareholders often opt to govern their contractual relationship through simple defaults, which may be 
more profitable for them, but can also bring negative effects for the company.
136
 In general terms, law 
aims to effectively address problems of combining action, promote benefits of coordination inside 
institutions and, consequently, to guarantee access of the community to efficient rules. This, I believe, 
justifies the conception of stronger defaults and the construction of new models of contract, such as 
the one of regulatory contractualisation. A central point of this scheme is the conception of corporate 
default rules as choreographers. From the game-theoretical model I have presented, two ways follow 
in which defaults could be readjusted. One option could be that the law gives space to the figure of the 
coordinator. She is a shareholder who credibly commits to not to sell her shares and convince the other 
members of the best strategy for the company. Another option is to give members of these companies 
the possibility to forbid one shareholder to sell at any given time. In these circumstances, the other 
shareholders (potential sellers) no longer face the prospect of the worst possible outcome, since they 
can themselves decide to retain the majority of the company as they are sure that one other shareholder 
will not sell. In this case, reducing a shareholder’s flexibility or freedom to sell, even randomly, makes 
other shareholders better off, at perhaps the cost of the shareholder who cannot sell. This idea begs 
some additional protection to compensate the potential seller if the others, in fact, end up selling. It 
also requires a broader discussion of the ways to better protect entitlements in PLLCs beyond property 
rules such as liability rules or prohibitive rules. Explaining which of these alternatives is more suitable 
                                                     
134 The existence of inefficient alternatives of contractual regulation enshrined by national legislation, and the safeguard of 
functional conditions of the market are the two main reasons why the alternative of regulatory contractualisation resists a 
fully-fledged operation of the principle of freedom of contract.  
135 As to players of the game, I am referring not only to shareholders but also to other stakeholders such as creditors. 
136 As it is interestingly put by Macaulay, Stewart, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’, American 
Sociological Review, vol. 28, 1963, pp. 55-67 (62), footnote 11 ‘[...] at times it is clear that businessmen fail to plan 
because of a lack of sophistication; they simply do not appreciate the risk they are running or they merely follow patterns 
established in their firms years ago without re-examining these practices in light of current conditions’. 
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to surpass problems of collective action in these companies goes beyond the scope of this paper.
137
 I, 
however, wish to unveil the question that will nurture further research work.  
                                                     
137See Calabresi, Guido, and Melamed Douglas, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 85, 1972, pp. 1089-1128. 
   
 
